University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2016

Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure
Jennifer Nou
Jed Stiglitz

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jennifer Nou & Jed Stiglitz, "Strategic Rulemaking Disclosure," 88 Southern California Law Review 773
(2016).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

ARTICLES
STRATEGIC RULEMAKING
DISCLOSURE
JENNIFER NOU AND EDWARD H. STIGLITZ*
ABSTRACT
Congressional enactments and executive orders instruct agencies to
publish their anticipated rules in what is known as the Unified Agenda. The
Agenda’s stated purpose is to ensure that political actors can monitor
regulatory development. Agencies have come under fire in recent years,
however, for conspicuous omissions and irregularities. Critics allege that
agencies hide their regulations from the public strategically, that is, to
thwart potential political opposition. Others contend that such behavior is
benign, perhaps the inevitable result of changing internal priorities or
unforeseen events.
To examine these competing hypotheses, this Article uses a new
dataset spanning over thirty years of rulemaking (1983–2014). Uniquely,
the dataset is drawn directly from the Federal Register. The resulting
findings reveal that agencies substantially underreport their rulemaking
activities—about 70 percent of their proposed rules do not appear on the
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Unified Agenda before publication. Importantly, agencies also appear to
disclose strategically with respect to Congress, though not with respect to
the president. The Unified Agenda is thus not a successful tool for
Congress to monitor and influence regulatory development. The results
suggest that legislative, not executive, innovations may help to augment
public participation and democratic oversight, though the net effects of
more transparency remain uncertain. The findings also raise further
inquiries, such as why Congress does not render disclosure requirements
judicially enforceable.
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INTRODUCTION
The regulatory process begins long before the notice of proposed
rulemaking makes its public appearance. Drafting a proposed rule can take
months, even years, of internal debate and effort.1 Agency staff must draft
regulatory text along with legal justifications and cost-benefit analyses.2 To
1. See William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and
Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
66, 69–70 (2004) [hereinafter West, Formal Procedures] (finding that the average length of the
proposal development period for the study’s 42 rules was more than 4 years).
2. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND POLICY 81, 246–47 (4th ed. 2011).
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do so, they must gather the requisite data to make informed decisions. For
this purpose, agencies often solicit input from potentially affected interest
groups and regulated entities.3 These interactions, however, are often
“informal and idiosyncratic.”4 They can range from meetings with
stakeholders to casual phone calls with individual contacts.5 These
communications are rarely public and often occur behind the scenes.6
Yet this stage of the rulemaking process—when agencies formulate
their policy proposals—is one of the most critical.7 Determining which
regulatory options are on-screen and off can shape the remainder of the
rulemaking. Because of the pre-proposal period’s importance, both
Congress and the president have required agencies to notify the public
about rules in the pipeline. In particular, these statutes and executive orders
instruct rulemaking agencies to publish their regulatory agendas every fall
and spring.8 Generally speaking, these agenda entries should disclose
planned regulatory actions for the upcoming year, though agencies can
include more long-term efforts as well.9 The Regulatory Information
Service Center (“RISC”) then compiles these individual agendas into what
3. See id. at 75–82; Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy
and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 281–85 (2004); Wendy Wagner et al.,
Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L.
REV. 99, 110–13 (2011); William F. West, Inside the Black Box: The Development of Proposed Rules
and the Limits of Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 576, 577 (2009) [hereinafter West, Black
Box]; West, Formal Procedures, supra note 1.
4. West, Black Box, supra note 3.
5. See id. at 591.
6. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plumber”: The Sausage-Making of
Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 71 (2013) (“[R]esearch on the pre-proposal stage of the rule
development process has traditionally been impeded by a lack of information; Administrative Procedure
Act docketing and other transparency requirements are generally limited to the period after publication
of the proposed rule.”).
7. Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory and
Evidence, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2) (on file with authors) (observing
that the stage preceding rule promulgation and enforcement “is one where some of the most critical
decisions are made to define what issues will eventually make it to the important later stages of [the
regulatory process].”).
8. See Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2012) (“During the months of October and
April of each year, each agency shall publish in the Federal Register a regulatory flexibility
agenda . . . .”).
9. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, About the Unified Agenda, REGINFO,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/UA_About.jsp (last visited Apr. 5, 2016)
(“The activities included in individual agency agendas are primarily those currently planned to have an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), or a
Final Rule issued within the next twelve months. However, to keep users better informed of
opportunities for participation in the rulemaking process, an agency may list in the ‘Long-Term
Actions’ section of its agenda those rules it expects will have the next regulatory action more than
twelve months after publication of the agenda.”).
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is known as the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions
(“Unified Agenda”).10
Agencies have recently come under fire, however, for conspicuous
omissions and irregularities.11 Under President George W. Bush,
Democratic legislators questioned the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s failure to include a regulation regarding risk assessments
in the Agenda as “highly unusual.”12 The Government Accountability
Office found numerous errors in samples prepared by prominent agencies,
including entries that should have appeared in previous editions of the
Unified Agenda, entries that reported the wrong date of regulatory action,
or entries that otherwise incorrectly reported the status of rules.13 Similarly,
the Congressional Research Service and the Administrative Conference of
the United States (“ACUS”), in work spearheaded by Curtis Copeland,
revealed that a substantial fraction of “significant” proposed rules was not
preceded by an Agenda entry.14 Copeland’s most recent work also finds
that many “significant” final rules were published in the first half of 2014
without notice in the Unified Agenda.15
10. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Current Regulatory Plan and the Unified Agenda of
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, REGINFO, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain (last
visited Apr. 10, 2016).
11. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, THE UNIFIED AGENDA: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 11–14 (April
13, 2015) https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Unified%20Agenda%20Draft%20Report
%20041315%20FINAL_0.pdf [hereinafter COPELAND, UNIFIED AGENDA PROPOSALS] (compiling
examples of agencies’ omissions and irregularities in their reporting).
12. Key Lawmakers Question OSHA’s Secrecy in Drafting Risk Assessment Rule,
INSIDEOSHAONLINE (Inside Wash. Publishers, Arlington, Va.), July 21, 2008, at 1.
13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-1024R, ACCURACY OF INFORMATION IN
THE UNIFIED AGENDA (2001). More specifically, the United States Government Accountability Office
study analyzed a sample of agendas prepared by the Departments of Commerce and Health and Human
Services, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), and the Securities and Exchange
Commission for April and October of 1999 and 2000, as well as for April 2001. Id.
14. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40713, THE UNIFIED AGENDA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR RULEMAKING TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION 9 (2009) [hereinafter
COPELAND, UNIFIED AGENDA TRANSPARENCY] (from a sample of 231 significant proposed rules in
2008, there were no Unified Agenda entries for “about one-quarter of the proposed rules . . . before they
were published in the Federal Register”); COPELAND, UNIFIED AGENDA PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at
43–44 (from a sample of 88 significant proposed rules from the first half of 2014, 94 percent “were
preceded by a ‘proposed rule stage’ entry in the previous edition of the Unified Agenda”). In addition,
out of 22 likely significant rules from independent agencies during the same time period, “[o]nly 7
(32%) of the 22 proposed rules examined had any . . . prior agenda entry . . . .” Id. at 47.
15. COPELAND, UNIFIED AGENDA PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 50 (finding that from a sample
of 55 “significant” final rules from the first half of 2014, one-quarter were not “immediately preceded
by a ‘final rule stage’ entry in the Unified Agenda”). As for independent agencies during the same time
period, Copeland examines 20 potentially significant rules and finds that “only seven (35%) had ‘final
rule stage’ entries in the preceding Unified Agenda.” Id. at 53.

2016]

STRATEGIC RULEMAKING DISCLOSURE

737

Republican committee members and other observers have also
criticized President Obama’s administration for not publishing separate
spring and fall Unified Agendas in 2012—a reelection year. Instead, the
Unified Agenda was released as an unprecedented single edition just days
before Christmas.16 The spring Agenda the following year was not
published until the summer.17 Interest groups and legislators accordingly
charged agencies with playing regulatory hide and seek.18 One accusation
was that agencies were releasing their Agendas during time periods—such
as the holidays or the summer—when external monitors were less likely to
pay attention.19 Another claim was that agencies were acting strategically
to keep regulations off the radar for as long as possible.20 The longer an
agency could shield its internal machinations, the less time those opposed
to the rule would have to mobilize against it. Indeed, Jacob Gersen and
Anne O’Connell posit that agencies often raise the monitoring costs for
their opponents in just this manner—a strategy particularly effective for
less-monitored agency actions such as rule withdrawals.21
The prospect of strategic disclosure by agencies is troubling in large
part because of the Unified Agenda’s intended function: to alert monitors
and interested parties of an agency’s regulatory activity before the agency
publishes its notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”).22 If an agency can
16. See Wayne Crews & Ryan Young, Missing: Regulatory Transparency, DAILY CALLER (Oct.
11, 2012, 3:52 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2012/10/11/missing-regulatory-transparency/; Hester Peirce,
More Sensible Regulations Require Predictable Disclosure, REAL CLEAR MKTS. (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2013/01/03/more_sensible_regulations_require_predictable_d
isclosure_100067.html (“The Spring 2012 edition was never released, thus breaking a nearly twodecade practice of agencies telling the public twice a year which regulations are under consideration.”);
Press Release, Committee Leaders Request Information on Agencies’ Missing Regulatory Agendas,
EDUC. & WORKFORCE COMMITTEE (May 24, 2013), http://edworkforce.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx? DocumentID=335456.
17. Unified Agenda: 3,503 Federal Regulations, 739 Affecting Small Businesses, SENSIBLE
REGS. (Jul. 7, 2013, 3:52 PM), http://www.sensibleregulations.org/2013/07/unified-agenda-3503federal-regulations-739-affecting-small-businesses/.
18. Press Release, Committee Leaders Request Information on Agencies’ Missing Regulatory
Agendas, supra note 16.
19. See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Big Sexy Holiday Fun with the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulations, FORBES (Dec. 2, 2013, 11:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2013/12/02/
big-sexy-holiday-fun-with-the-unified-agenda-of-federal-regulations/.
20. See Press Release, Cong. Docs. & Pubs., Vitter: Administrative Evading Regulation
Transparency Obligation (Jan. 23, 2013) (claiming that one possibility for missing Agenda was that the
“administration [was] intentionally hiding its regulatory agenda” as part of “a coordinated effort across
agencies to keep the American people in the dark”).
21. See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and
Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1173–75 (2009).
22. See Letter from James W. Conrad, Jr., Chair of Section of Admin. Law & Regulatory
Practice, ABA, to Boris Bershteyn, Acting Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs (Nov. 30,
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selectively hide regulations from public view, then interested parties may
not be able to bring their informed perspectives to bear. This worry is
heightened given that the most significant policy decisions are often made
during this pre-proposal stage of regulatory development.23 Such concerns
mirror those in other contexts of potentially strategic disclosure such as in
patent filings,24 graduate school rankings,25 and corporate
communications.26 The underlying fear in these settings is that legal actors
can reveal information in ways that are privately beneficial, but at the
expense of social welfare or other values. Indeed, many interest groups and
trade associations rely on the Agenda to monitor rules of concern. Curtis
Copeland reports, for example, that the Associated General Contractors of
America, various financial industry publications, and consulting firms
regularly use the Unified Agenda to identify upcoming rules of interest.27
Other consumers also include members of Congress, the Congressional
Research Service, and the Office of the Federal Register.28
At the same time, what is currently known about the actual
determinants of agency disclosure behavior during this critical pre-proposal
phase is still limited.29 Most efforts to shed light on the relevant dynamics

2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/administrative_law/unified_ regulat
ory_agendas_letter.authcheckdam.pdf (“[T]he Unified Regulatory Agenda is an integral part of the
Federal regulatory process. Its semiannual publication enables regulated entities, consumers, workers,
and other interested persons to understand and prepare for new rules that are planned or under
development. As the Section noted in its 2000 Report to the President-Elect, the Agenda ‘provides
important information to agency heads, centralized reviewers, and the public at large, thereby serving
the values of open government.’ The timeliness of its publication is especially important given that the
information it contains is not updated consistently in any other fashion.”) (quoting ABA Section of
Admin. Law & Regulatory Practice, Twenty-First Century Governance: Improving the Federal
Administrative Process, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1099, 1104–05 (2000)); infra Part I.
23. See infra Part I.
24. See, e.g., Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race, 48
J.L. & ECON. 173 (2005).
25. See, e.g., Michael Luca & Jonathan Smith, Strategic Disclosure: The Case of Business
School Rankings, 112 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 17 (2015).
26. See, e.g., Richard Whittington & Basak Yakis-Douglas, Strategic Disclosure: Strategy as a
Form of Reputation Management, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 402
(Michael L. Barnett & Timothy G. Pollock eds., 2012); Jeffrey T. Doyle & Matthew J. Magilke, The
Timing of Earnings Announcements: An Examination of the Strategic Disclosure Hypothesis, 84 ACCT.
REV. 157 (2009).
27. COPELAND, UNIFIED AGENDA PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 10.
28. Id. at 9–10.
29. See COPELAND, UNIFIED AGENDA TRANSPARENCY, supra note 14, at 8 (noting unawareness
“of any studies examining the extent to which federal agencies’ proposed rules were, in fact, preceded
by ‘proposed rule’ entries in the Unified Agenda”) (quoting Letter from Victor S. Rezendez, Managing
Dir., Strategic Issues, to Ronald C. Kelly, Exec. Dir., Regulatory Info. Serv. Ctr. (July 27, 2001), in
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-1024R, ACCURACY OF INFORMATION IN THE UNIFIED
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have, until now, relied on limited samples from select agencies—hampered
by the lack of useable data with which to make more general observations.
As others have noted, further research is needed not only about why
agencies would disclose their agendas, but also how they set these agendas
in the first place.30 Agenda-formation is likely to be influenced by a host of
factors, including the respective priorities of appointed agency heads;31
mandatory statutory requirements;32 as well as the preferences of political
monitors and external interest groups.33
More broadly, the bulk of existing empirical research in administrative
law focuses on how agencies approach the notice-and-comment process—
the period after the agency promulgates its proposed rule. Extant work, for
example, has examined the extent to which agencies shun rulemaking
altogether,34 strategically channel their efforts into other policymaking
forms,35 use the rulemaking process to engage particular interest groups to
their advantage,36 or manipulate the length of their comment periods.37

AGENDA (2001)); Steven J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions from an
Empirical Study of EPA’s Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521, 545
(1994) (noting the need for a more systematic study of question).
30. See Coglianese & Walters, supra note 7 (“[R]egulatory agenda-setting merits careful analysis
and systemic study.”); William F. West & Connor Raso, Who Shapes the Rulemaking Agenda?
Implications for Bureaucratic Responsiveness and Bureaucratic Control, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 495, 495 (2012) (“Scholars have neglected a critical stage of the administrative process”;
namely, the agency’s “decision to begin developing a rule. . . ”).
31. See Coglianese & Walters, supra note 7, at 9.
32. See West & Raso, supra note 30 (finding that the “vast majority” of rules in their sample
were required by Congress).
33. See Coglianese & Walters, supra note 7, at 9–17.
34. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An
Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1414, 1440 (2012) [hereinafter Yackee & Yackee, Testing Ossification] (“[Since] notice and comment
rulemaking has become more costly since the mid-1970s, agencies will fail to utilize notice and
comment as much as they should.”).
35. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case
of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (1987); Edward H. Stiglitz, Expertise and Agencies
Choices over Policymaking Form: The Strategic Substitution Effect (Oct. 30, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with authors).
36. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures
as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 264–71 (1987) [hereinafter McNollgast,
Administrative Procedures as Instruments]; Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166
(1984); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics
and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431,
444 (1989) [hereinafter McNollgast, Structure and Process].
37. Rachel Augustine Potter, Procedural Politicking: Agency Risk Management in the Federal
Rulemaking Process (Feb. 20, 2015) (working paper at 2), https://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/images/
publications/rule-Potter.pdf
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Comparatively lacking are efforts to better understand agency choices
before a proposed rule appears to the public for comment.38
This Article uses a new dataset obtained from over 30 years of
rulemaking across a wide range of agencies to test empirically whether
agencies strategically disclose in the Unified Agenda. Uniquely, the dataset
draws directly from the Federal Register, which is the government’s
“official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of federal
agencies and organizations.”39 Since agencies must publish in its pages for
their rules to gain legal effect, the Federal Register provides the most
comprehensive look possible at agency rulemaking behavior.40 By contrast,
virtually all contemporary empirical work on agency behavior relies on
agency self-reporting in the Unified Agenda,41 which our results suggest is
38. Note that this gap in the literature is matched by a gap in the law: very little of administrative
law addresses the phase of the rulemaking process in which agencies, in fact, make fundamental choices
about the contents of rules. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of
Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2014) (“[T]he actual workings of the administrative
state have increasingly diverged from the assumptions animating the APA and classic judicial decisions
that followed.”).
39. About Federal Register, U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFF., http://www.gpo.gov/help/about_federal_
register.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
40. See 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (2012). See also Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of
Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 928 (2008)
(“Publication in the Federal Register is the official means of notifying the public of new regulations,
and agency activity cannot be hidden if agencies expect anyone to comply with their rules.”); Randy S.
Springer, Note, Gatekeeping and the Federal Register: An Analysis of the Publication Requirement of
Section 552(a)(1)(D) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 544 (1989)
(“Agency documents that fall within the provisions of the publication rule of section 552(a)(1)(D) and
are not so published are ineffective against a party without actual notice.”). As we will discuss, while
agencies face little consequence for omitting entries from the Unified Agenda, they are legally required
to publish their proposed and final rules in the Federal Register, short of providing actual notice to the
relevant parties. See infra Part I.
41. See O’Connell, supra note 40, at 927 n.108 (“Although they provide a critical perspective on
the administrative state, the Unified Agenda are not perfect; they need confirmatory research.”). For
examples of studies relying on the Unified Agenda database, see Alex Acs & Charles M. Cameron,
Does White House Regulatory Review Produce a Chilling Effect and “OIRA Avoidance” in the
Agencies, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 443, 443 (2013); Steven J. Balla, Between Commenting and
Negotiation: The Contours of Public Participation in Agency Rulemaking, 1 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 59, 70 (2005) (“[U]se of the Unified Agenda ensures that the set of rulemakings under
study represents as complete a snapshot as possible of [Department of Transportation rulemaking
activities] . . . .”); Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Consensual Rule Making and the Time It Takes to
Develop Rules, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS 187–206 (George A. Krause & Kenneth J.
Meier eds., 2003); Steven J. Balla, Political Control, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Public Commenting
on Agency Regulations, 93 PUB. ADMIN. 524, 536 n.12 (2014); Jack M. Beermann, Midnight Rules: A
Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 285, 319 (2013); Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 21,
at 1177; Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking from
2001–2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 780–81 (2008); Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After Midnight: The
Durability of the Midnight Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40
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substantially underinclusive. One hope is that this dataset improves the
current state of the art.
Our empirical results reveal three main findings. First, agencies only
report, on average, about 28 percent of their proposed rules. In other words,
roughly 72 percent of proposed rules are not contained in the Unified
Agenda. Second, this underreporting is sensitive to the congressional
oversight environment, especially for those rules that are likely to be more
substantial. In particular, when the president and Congress are from
different parties, executive agencies are less likely to publicly report their
planned regulatory activities. Notably, this effect does not seem to hold for
independent agencies, over which the president has less control. Third, and
relatedly, there is little evidence of strategic disclosure with respect to the
president. Our evidence is tentative here, but even when agency heads are
expected to have different policy preferences from the president, they do
not appear to strategically hide their rules from the Unified Agenda. We
suspect this is due in part to the president’s superior ability, relative to
Congress, to obtain information about regulatory development through
more informal means of communications within the executive branch.
Perhaps the most important normative implication of our findings is
that Congress currently lacks an effective information-forcing mechanism
with which to monitor agencies before they release their proposed rules.
The existing mechanism becomes even less reliable when it arguably
matters the most: when Congress and the president are from different
political parties. For the same reason, there are also no dependable means
for interest groups to alert resource-constrained legislative committees
before the rule is proposed.42 The phenomenon also raises the possibility
that agencies could skew which interest groups will mobilize in reaction to
their proposed rules. Agencies might do this by selectively disclosing those
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1441, 1454–55 (2005); Michael R. See, Willful Blindness: Federal Agencies’
Failure to Comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act’s Periodic Review Requirement—And Current
Proposals to Invigorate the Act, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1199, 1217–19 (2006); Stuart Shapiro,
Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under the Clinton and Bush (43)
Administrations, 23 J.L. & POL. 393, 400–01 (2007); Edward H. Stiglitz, Unaccountable Midnight
Rulemaking? A Normatively Informative Assessment, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 156
(2014); Wagner et al., supra note 3, at 123–36; Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee,
Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”?, 20 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 261, 267–68 (2006) [hereinafter Yackee & Yackee, Ossified]; Susan
Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-proposal Agenda Building and Blocking During
Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 373, 379 (2012); Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124
HARV. L. REV. 994, 1007–08 (2011).
42. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 36, at 175–76.
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regulations that will benefit its mission-oriented constituents, while hiding
those that will rally their detractors. These dynamics, in turn, raise
additional concerns about the extent to which less well-resourced groups
that lack access to agency decisionmaking through informal means can
meaningfully participate in the regulatory process.43
Part I provides background on the Unified Agenda and a motivating
theory for the monitoring function that it serves for political overseers and
interest groups. Part II, in turn, presents our empirical findings on the
extent to which agencies disclose their regulatory activities strategically
with respect to congressional oversight. In light of the resulting normative
concerns, Part III suggests some ameliorative legislative responses.
Specifically, Congress could amend the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) to require that agencies issue judicially enforceable advance
notices of proposed rulemaking with a good cause exception, or narrow the
logical outgrowth doctrine.44 Such reforms could help to restore the ability
of political monitors and interest groups to participate more meaningfully
in the regulatory development process.
I. MONITORING REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT
Both Congress and the president have issued a number of statutes and
executive orders that, together, mandate agencies to disclose their planned
regulatory activities for the upcoming year. This Part provides background
for these disclosure requirements and grounds them in a well-known theory
regarding the function of administrative procedures—ensuring that political
actors can monitor the regulatory development process.
A. MONITORING FUNCTION
Presidents and Congress face a common dilemma: they need agencies
to carry out important public policies, but agencies have superior
information for how to do so. Executive and legislative overseers, in other
words, suffer from an information asymmetry. As a result, there is a danger
that the agency’s preference will prevail over those of democratically
elected representatives. Moreover, the technical nature of many regulations,
along with the sheer volume of rules produced, render it challenging for
political principals to know what is happening in the bureaucracy, much
less to influence or control it.
43. See Krawiec, supra note 6, at 77–78; Wagner et al., supra note 3, at 106–09.
44. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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Under a familiar view developed by a team of positive political
theorists, collectively known as “McNollgast,”45 administrative procedures
represent one solution to this information problem. Paradigmatically, the
APA’s notice-and-comment process forces agencies to reveal their
contemplated regulations before imposing final versions of them. As its
name suggests, notice-and-comment rulemaking requires agencies to give
notice of a proposed rule in the Federal Register and then provide parties
with an opportunity to submit comments. The agency must base the
rulemaking upon consideration of those comments and include a statement
of basis and purpose in the final rule adopted. Final rules adopted according
to this procedure operate with the force of law.46
Given this comment period, McNollgast argues, Congress can
intervene in the regulatory process in a timely manner, whether through
hearings, budgetary threats, or other forms of influence.47 Note that
Congress itself does not have to actively monitor the agencies. Instead, it
can shift these monitoring costs onto motivated third parties.48 These
regulated entities and interest groups, in turn, can use public notices of
proposed rulemakings to alert sympathetic legislative committee members
of problematic rules.49 They may do so through various avenues, such as
constituent letters, protests, or lobbying.50
One wrinkle to this story, however, is that, in practice, many
substantive policy decisions happen before the agency publishes the notice
of proposed rulemaking.51 Although this account is contested,52 interest
45. See McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments, supra note 36, at 244;
McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 36, at 442.
46. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(c) (2000).
47. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84–90
(2006).
48. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 21, at 1170 (“The average agency is monitored by a
diverse mix of public actors and private interest groups.”).
49. See id. at 1172.
50. McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments, supra note 36, at 254.
51. See infra Part I.B.
52. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Keynote Address at the Brookings Institute: The Future of Erulemaking: Promoting Public Participation and Efficiency (Nov. 30, 2010) (“Proposed rules are a way
of obtaining comments on rules and the comments are taken exceedingly seriously.”). Part of the
challenge in assessing these divergent views is that it is not clear that the accounts share a common
baseline. Sunstein may be right that agencies take the comments seriously, and the reports of interest
groups may also be right that most of the substantive decisions occur before the notice. For example,
suppose that 80 percent, in some relevant sense, of the eventual rule is “determined” before the notice,
and that 20 percent is responsive to comments. In this scenario, observing that agencies take comments
seriously does not undermine the view that most fundamental policy choices occur prior to notice.
Conversely, observing that a rule is essentially a “done deal” prior to notice does not undermine the
view that agencies take the comment process seriously.
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groups report regarding proposed rules as a “done deal,” noting that there is
less “wiggle room” for revisions once the NPRM appears.53 Similarly, Don
Elliott, the former general counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”), has likened the comment process to Kabuki theater, a “highly
stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of something
which in real life takes place in other venues.”54 Notice-and-comment, in
this view, is simply a formality used to ratify decisions that have already
been made by the agency or negotiated during executive review.55 The
available empirical evidence on the issue is mixed. Some small-sample
studies find that rules change from proposal to final stage sufficiently
enough to conclude that the notice-and-comment process is
consequential.56 Other efforts, also based on small samples, find that the
changes are minor—such as semantic changes or revised effective dates—
and thus do not implicate central policy choices already made in the
proposed rule.57
The magnitude of the changes wrought by the notice-and-comment
process is still an open question, but important for our purposes are the
incentives agencies currently have to release close-to-final proposed
rules.58 Most relevant is the judicial determination of what constitutes
adequate notice under the APA. Specifically, courts require final rules to be
a “logical outgrowth” of the notice of proposed rulemaking. 59 In essence,
53. Sara Rinfret, Changing the Rules: Interest Groups and Federal Environmental Rulemaking
166 (Aug. 13, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Northern Arizona University) (on file with
authors). See also KERWIN, supra note 2, at 195–96 (reporting results from a survey of interest group
participants, showing that they perceive pre-notice contacts to be most effective in influencing rule
development).
54. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992).
55. See Simon F. Haeder & Susan Webb Yackee, Influence and the Administrative Process:
Lobbying the U.S. President’s Office of Management and Budget, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 507, 518
(2015) (finding evidence that lobbying by business groups, but not public interest groups, results in
changes during OIRA regulatory review).
56. See, e.g., Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and the Political Control of the
Bureaucracy, 92 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 663, 663–673 (1998); Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the
Fourth Branch: Assessing the Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking,
16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 103, 103–124 (2006).
57. See, e.g., Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rulemaking Process: Who
Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard? 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 245–70 (1998); West,
Formal Procedures, supra note 1, at 68.
58. See Lisa Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1749, 1757 (2007) (noting that the APA no longer serves the informational function contemplated by its
drafters; indeed, “[a]lthough the APA reflects a political compromise, the Court has not understood it as
restricted to the original bargain—that is, as providing serious constraints only for formal adjudication
and not for other forms of agency action”).
59. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983);
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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this requirement mandates that an agency’s final rule must have been
reasonably foreseeable by interested parties.60 A rule will correspondingly
be set aside if “interested parties would have had to ‘divine [the agency’s]
unspoken thoughts,’ because the final rule was surprisingly distant from the
proposed rule.”61 The notice of proposed rulemaking, that is, must be
detailed and specific enough to alert potential commentators that their
interests are at stake. A number of recent D.C. Circuit cases suggest that
the doctrine is still alive and well.62
At the same time, courts have required agencies to disclose in their
notices the key data and studies they relied upon to formulate their
proposals.63 Consequently, the function of the proposal has evolved from
genuinely providing notice to the public about contemplated regulatory
actions to, instead, creating a rulemaking record suitable for judicial
review.64 The purpose of the proposed rule, in other words, is no longer to
invite public comments and to gather information on a contemplated
rulemaking.
Rather, it is the opening salvo in anticipated litigation on what is
increasingly likely to amount to the final rule.65 Resulting from these
dynamics is an increased pressure on agencies to shift their actual
information gathering to before the notice-and-comment period to reduce
the litigation risks arising from the rulemaking record.66 Some empirical
evidence supports this view. Beyond the notices of proposed rules analyzed
below,67 we also collected the final rules promulgated by agencies. As a
60. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Small Refiner, 705 F.2d
at 547.
61. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (alteration
in original) (quoting Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407
F.3d 1250, 1259–1260 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
62. See, e.g., Allina Health Servs. v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Ass’n of
Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2012); CSX, 584 F.3d at 1083;
Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding that an agency must provide all information material to its proposal in order to facilitate
adequate public comment). See also MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 46–49 (1988) (discussing ways in which courts required agencies to
create a record to facilitate interest group involvement and eventual review).
64. See Elliott, supra note 54 (“What was once (perhaps) a means for securing public input into
agency decisions has become today primarily a method for compiling a record for judicial review.”).
65. See Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 856, 899 (2007); Wagner et al., supra note 3, at 110 (“[I]f a rule is to survive judicial review, it
must essentially be in final form at the proposed rule stage.”).
66. Wagner et al., supra note 3, at 110–11.
67. See Appendix B for details.

746

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:733

result, we can then compare features of proposed rules over time with those
of final rules over time. Figure 1 shows those characteristics relevant to
changing proposed and final rule drafting practices. On the x-axis runs the
average number of words of NPRMs in a given year (on the log scale); on
the y-axis runs the average number of references to revisions in the final
rule for that year.68 What is remarkable about this figure is that there is a
strong negative relationship between the length of the proposed rule and the
number of revisions noted in the final rule.69 One possible implication is
that more substantial rules are revisited less often after the comment period,
thus heightening the importance of the regulatory development period.
Moreover, the general trend over time appears to be for agencies to issue
longer proposed rules and to revise final rules less as well. Though this
relationship might owe to other aspects of the legal, regulatory, or political
environment that have changed between 1983 and 2010, the figure is at
least suggestive that the dynamics scholars associate with the logical
outgrowth doctrine—above all, creating the incentive for agencies to issue
near-final proposals—are, in fact, a reality.

68. In particular, we count the number of times that the final rule mentions that it was “revised”
or “amended.” Obviously, agencies might express revisions in other language, and we might likewise
have some false positive counts, but we feel that to a first approximation, this count is informative of
the quantity of revisions between proposed and final rule.
69. The correlation between the 2 variables at the year level is -0.66, statistically significant at
any conventional level.
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FIGURE 1. Changing Rulemaking Practices
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B. THE UNIFIED AGENDA
Against this backdrop, political principals have understandably sought
alternative means to become informed about what agencies are
contemplating before they release their proposed rules. Indeed, one way to
understand pre-proposal notification requirements like the Unified Agenda
is as a legislative and executive branch substitute for the APA. Because the
APA’s judicialization has blunted the information-forcing value of the
statute, regulatory agendas represent an effort by political overseers to
reassert their ability to monitor agency rule development. By granting
interest groups early notice about regulations on the radar, such groups can,
once again, help political principals to monitor the bureaucracy.
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Political principals benefit from prenotice information in several ways.
First, such information facilitates relatively low-cost interventions into the
rulemaking process. During the early stages of regulatory development,
overseers can induce agency responsiveness with modest and low-visibility
interventions such as informal meetings or staff-level phone calls that are
less effective once the agency has published an NPRM. Second,
McNollgast points out that if agencies are allowed to present Congress or
the president with a fait accompli, agencies may be able to design the rule
to upset legislative coalitions that might otherwise oppose the regulation.70
Hence, early warning systems are critical for allowing intervention before
the agency has developed a rule that can pick off members of such
alliances.71
President Jimmy Carter first ordered the publication of a semiannual
regulatory agenda in 1978 to give the public “adequate notice” of
“significant” regulations that were “under development or review” at
executive agencies.72 What counted as “significant” under the executive
order was left to agency discretion but included the consequences and
burdens of a rule on individuals, businesses, and state and local
governments.73 For these rules, agencies were not expected to provide
precise timetables of predicted rulemakings, but rather enough information
to describe the essential substance of a contemplated agency action.74
Two years later, Congress passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(“RFA”).75 The Act’s legislative history suggests that the statute was
intended only to supplement the executive order. Its narrower aim was to
require agencies to consider the impact of their regulations on small
businesses and to improve public participation accordingly.76 The statute
also extended the agenda requirement to independent regulatory agencies,77
mandating that all agencies publish an annual regulatory agenda in October
and April for rules “likely to have a significant economic impact on a
70. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 21, at 1163 (Strategic agency behavior “can allow the
monitored to choose the monitors”); McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 36, at 434–44.
71. See McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 36, at 434–44.
72. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, 12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978).
73. Id.
74. Id. (“At a minimum, each published agenda shall describe the regulations being considered
by the agency, the need for and the legal basis for the action being taken, and the status of regulations
previously listed on the agenda.”).
75. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C §§ 601–612 (2012)).
76. S. REP. NO. 96-878, at 1–2 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2788, 2788–89.
77. Id. at 2.
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substantial number of small entities.”78 The agendas had to contain an
“approximate schedule” for the agency action.79 Agencies were then called
upon to send these agendas to the Small Business Administration (“SBA”)
for comment, as well as to other representatives of small businesses.80 In
this manner, while the executive order granted agencies substantial
discretion in terms of when and what to publish, the new statute heightened
the substantive and timing requirements for those regulations salient to
small businesses.
Shortly after the RFA’s enactment, President Ronald Reagan revoked
Carter’s executive order and issued his own.81 Among other things,
Reagan’s order expanded the RFA by requiring both independent and
executive agencies to submit agenda items for all proposed regulations that
agencies expected to issue, not just those expected to impact small
businesses.82 These requirements were later reinforced by President
William J. Clinton’s own executive order, which similarly required all
agencies to “prepare an agenda of all regulations under development or
review.”83 The order further charged the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) with specifying the “time and manner” in
which the Unified Agenda was compiled.84 In recent years, OIRA has
issued calls for Agenda entries anywhere from 3 to 6 months before the
Unified Agenda’s publication; many agencies, however, begin to prepare
their Agenda entries beforehand, while others update them after
submission, and even publication, deadlines.85
These Agenda entries usually include the agency’s name, a short
description of the rule along with its title, as well as the agency’s priority
designations—roughly, whether the agency believes the action to be
nonsignificant, significant, or economically significant.86 The entries also
78. 5 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1).
79. Id. § 602(c)(2).
80. Id. § 602(b)–(c).
81. Exec. Order. No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982), revoked
by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012).
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 5(a).
83. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2000). Each agenda entry, in turn, is required to contain “a regulation, identifier number, a brief
summary of the action, the legal authority for the action, any legal deadline for the action, and the name
and telephone number of a knowledgeable agency official.” Id.
84. Id.
85. COPELAND, UNIFIED AGENDA PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 23–24.
86. More specifically, agencies can prioritize the rule as: 1) “Economically Significant”; 2)
“Other Significant”: “This category includes rules that the agency anticipates will be reviewed under
Executive Order 12866 or rules that are a priority of the agency head”; 3) “Substantive,
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provide the legal basis for the rule, an agency contact, an estimated
schedule for the rulemaking, and whether the rule is expected to affect
various interests such as states, small businesses, or other countries.
Finally, upon its first appearance in the Unified Agenda, each rule is also
assigned a Regulation Identifier Number (“RIN”), which is designed to
allow the public to track the entry through the various stages of the
rulemaking process.87 A sample Unified Agenda entry can be found in
Appendix A. After agencies submit their draft Agendas, OIRA may then
send comments or questions back to the agency regarding the content or
anticipated timing of regulations.88 For the most part, OIRA’s review is
highly deferential and generally allows agencies to determine the final
content.89
Notably, neither the congressional enactments nor executive orders
create legally enforceable rights. The original RFA explicitly precluded
judicial review,90 while later amendments subject some sections to judicial
review, but still exclude the provisions pertaining to regulatory agenda
requirements.91 The current statutory regime is clear that agencies are not
Nonsignificant”: “A rulemaking that has substantive impacts but is neither Significant, nor Routine
and Frequent, nor Informational/Administrative/Other.”; 4) “Routine and Frequent”: “[A] specific case
of a multiple recurring application of a regulatory program in the Code of Federal Regulations and that
does not alter the body of the regulation.”; or 5) “Informational/Administrative/Other”: “A rulemaking
that is primarily informational . . . but that the agency places in the Unified Agenda to inform the
public of the activity.” REGULATORY INFO. SERV. CTR., INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFIED
AGENDA OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AND DEREGULATORY ACTIONS (2011),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-12-22/pdf/2014-28927.pdf.
87. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, How to Use the Unified Agenda, REGINFO,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/UA_HowTo.jsp (last visited Mar. 31, 2016).
88. See COPELAND, UNIFIED AGENDA PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 25–26.
89. See id. at 25. See also Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1179 (2012) (“This planning process affords OIRA
several opportunities to identify regulations that might implicate the jurisdiction or interests of other
agencies, and to intervene to help ensure that such actions are consistent and coordinated. It is not
clear, however, whether in practice OIRA spends significant resources on such tasks.”); Sally Katzen,
OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and Recommendations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 111 (2011) (as a former
OIRA administrator, opining that the regulatory agenda “process itself has become more of a paper
exercise than an analytical tool”).
90. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 3(a), 94 Stat. 1164, 1169–70 (1980)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 611 (2012)) (“Except as otherwise provided in [an inapplicable
subsection], any determination by an agency concerning the applicability of any of the provisions of
this chapter to any action of the agency shall not be subject to judicial review.”). See Paul Verkuil, A
Critical Guide to RFA, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213, 259–62 (1982) (describing the legislative history of the
RFA and implications for judicial review).
91. More specifically, the 1996 Amendments made certain provisions of the RFA subject to
judicial review, but excluded the relevant regulatory agenda provisions at 5 U.S.C. § 602 (2012). See
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, Pub. L. 104-121, § 242, 110 Stat. 865 (1996)
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precluded from “acting on any matter not included” in their agenda, nor are
agencies required to consider any listed matters.92 The Reagan and Clinton
executive orders similarly explicitly preclude the creation of any legally
enforceable rights.93 Courts will thus not set aside an agency rule for failing
to appear in the Unified Agenda.94 This observation is important as it grants
a substantial degree of freedom into agencies’ decisions over whether to
report their activity to the Unified Agenda. Doing so does not commit
agencies to issue the listed rule; more importantly for our purposes, an
agency’s failure to report a planned rule to the Agenda does not jeopardize
the legal status of the eventual rule.
II. STRATEGIC DISCLOSURE
Given the discretion agencies possess to disclose a contemplated rule,
this Part examines what incentives agencies face to disclose during the preproposal period. These motivations, in turn, generate hypotheses that we
test against a novel dataset drawn from the Federal Register.
A. DECIDING TO DISCLOSE
Once an agency has determined its regulatory agenda, it faces a
tradeoff when deciding whether to disclose that agenda. On the one hand,
disclosure allows agencies to avoid potential reprisals from political
overseers for failing to comply with reporting requirements; these rebukes
include not only legislative hearings, but also potentially novel and onerous
judicially enforceable procedures, along the lines Congress routinely
threatens to impose on agencies.95 So the agency must pick and choose
which rules to report and which not to report. An agency will therefore use
its “budget” for noncompliance on the rules most likely to benefit the
agency. Indeed, sometimes compliance itself benefits agencies, as they use
disclosure to appease interest groups with promises—both credible and
hollow—of future reforms. After a number of high profile shooting deaths,
for example, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced in the Unified

(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 611 (2012)).
92. 5 U.S.C. § 602(d) (2012).
93. Exec. Order. No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. §§ 133–134 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982),
revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 649 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2012).
94. One possible path might be to appeal to common law reliance interests. See Groseclose,
supra note 29, at 527. To our knowledge, however, there are no cases suggesting such a remedy, and we
see dim prospects for the success of any such challenge. Id.
95. See infra Part III.
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Agenda its plans to issue a rule that would bar more groups from owning
guns—a move celebrated by gun control advocates.96
But often disclosure is costly to the agency. It can invite greater
opposition, as evidenced by the National Rifle Association’s heated
reaction to the DOJ disclosure.97 Opposition can come not only from
interest groups, but also the agency’s political overseers with divergent
preferences. Indeed, agency goals may depart from those of the president or
Congress for numerous reasons. Administrators and civil servants may be
captured by narrow interest groups, thus resulting in mutually beneficial
special favors.98 More recent work also identifies regulators’ incentives to
signal valuable human capital or else expand the market for their
postgovernment services.99 For any of these reasons, agencies may seek
regulatory (or deregulatory) policies that are at odds with congressional or
executive desires.
As a result, agencies confront the risk of having their policy decisions
opposed by Congress, while executive agencies face this risk with respect
to the president as well. Congress, for its part, can always override a rule by
amending the authorizing statute. Similarly, it can also veto the rule
through the Congressional Review Act, which like a statutory amendment,
would also require presidential assent.100 Alternatively, and perhaps more
96. See, e.g., Dave Boyer, Obama Intent to Toughen Gun Laws, With or Without Congress’
Help, WASH. TIMES (June 21, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/21/after-southcarolina-obama-intent-on-gun-restricti/ (citing the DOJ’s “disclosure . . . in the administration’s Unified
Agenda, a semiannual publication of proposed rules that the government intends to implement”); Matt
Vespa, Good News: DOJ Says New Gun Regulations Are Coming In November, TOWNHALL (May 31,
2015), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2015/05/31/good-news-doj-says-new-gun-regulations-are
-coming-in-november-n2006276.
97. Obama’s “Unified Agenda” of Regulatory Objectives Causes Fear, Confusion, NAT’L RIFLE
ASS’N INS. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (June 5, 2015), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20150605/obamasunified-agenda-of-regulatory-objectives-causes-fear-confusion.
98. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 167, 169 (1990) (discussing
the “special interest . . . theory of regulatory behavior, which describes actors in the regulatory process
as having narrow, self-interested goals—principally job retention or the pursuit of reelection, selfgratification from the exercise of power, or perhaps postofficeholding personal wealth”).
99. For a summary of this literature, see Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1265, 1267–69 (2015).
100. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012). That Act, among other things, requires agencies to send a
copy of every new final rule and its associated analysis to Congress and the Government Accountability
Office. § 801(a)(1)(A)–(B). Within a 60 day review period, Congress can use expedited procedures to
pass a joint resolution of disapproval overturning the rule. § 801(a)(3)(B). To date, however, the statute
has been used only once in over a decade to invalidate a rule. That rule was the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration’s ergonomics standard in March 2001, “an action that some believe to be unique
to the circumstances of its passage.” MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30116,
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likely, Congress could intervene through a variety of less costly tools: for
example, refusing to grant an agency any funds to enforce the rule,101 or
subjecting the agency head to bruising oversight hearings.102 The president,
for his part, also has multiple tools of agency influence. He could, for
example, attempt to exercise directive authority over his appointed agency
head, or more likely, assert supervisory power through a review process
coordinated by OIRA.103 By presidential order, executive agencies must
submit to OIRA “significant” regulatory actions for review, defined as
those “likely to result in a rule” that meets at least one of several criteria,
such as having “an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more,”
or raising “novel legal or policy issues.”104 During this review, OIRA could
negotiate revisions to the rule, send the regulation back to the agency
through a return letter or else encourage a withdrawal.105 For particularly
recalcitrant agency heads, the president could threaten removal as well.
Any of these outcomes is costly to the agency. Such interventions can
upset months or years of work formulating the regulatory proposal.106 The
effort required to engage with legislative or White House staff is expensive
as well. Because administrative agencies invest considerable resources in
formulating their proposed rules, they have an interest in preserving their
major policy decisions in the final rule. They will thus undertake strategies
designed to preserve this bureaucratic autonomy by minimizing the
probability of having their proposed rules watered down or effectively
reversed.
One of these strategies involves the agency’s decision of whether or
not to disclose a rule in its regulatory agenda. Of course, all agencies
eventually have to disclose their proposed rules upon publication in the
Federal Register. At that point, they will also be subject to many of the
aforementioned dynamics, including fear of reprisal from interest groups

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE 6 (2008). At the same time, however, Congress has
passed joint resolutions of disapproval during President Obama’s second term, setting up visible vetoes
by the president. See, e.g., Gregory Korte, Obama Vetoes Attempt to Kill Clean Water Rule, USA
TODAY (Jan. 19, 2015, 8:48 PM), http://usat.ly/1V73Q55.
101. See Beermann, supra note 47, at 84–90.
102. See id. at 124–27.
103. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277–78 (2001).
104. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. §§ 641–642 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2012). For a discussion of how OIRA treats this determination, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1850–54 (2012).
105. Sunstein, supra note 104, at 1846–47.
106. See West, Formal Procedures, supra note 1, at 416.
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and political overseers. What is distinctive about early disclosure in the
Agenda, however, is the greater ability of agencies to bargain over and still
revise their regulatory policy choices at this stage. By contrast, an agency’s
later disclosure as a published proposed rule subjects the agency to the
constraints of the logical outgrowth doctrine.107 As a result—unless the
agency withdraws the rule entirely and further delays the rulemaking—the
agency can claim that its hands are now tied with respect to the central
policy choices. Agencies thus have greater incentive to shield their
proposals at the agenda stage when their policy choices are more
vulnerable. Relatedly, agencies also have an interest in avoiding early
disclosure since presenting near-final proposals to the public for the first
time allows agencies to divide and otherwise upend coalitions that would
form in opposition.108 Broad disclosure arms opponents with more time to
coordinate their attack. Selective early disclosure, by contrast, allows
agencies to give more notice to expected supporters of the rule.
Our initial objective below, therefore, is to determine the extent to
which agencies fail to disclose their rulemaking efforts before they
formally propose the rule. Such failures deprive the public of the
opportunity to get involved in the formulation of the notice of proposed
rulemaking, which contains policy choices that are difficult to later reverse
without a complete withdrawal. Once the rule has been proposed, however,
the public now has notice that the agency is engaged in a rulemaking effort.
At the same time, many rules issue without prior notice—for example,
rules promulgated pursuant to the APA’s “good cause” or other
exceptions.109 Disclosure of these rules would be valuable to explore, as we
hope to in future work, but for now, empirical evidence seems to suggest
that most of such actions “involve administrative or technical issues with
limited applicability.”110
If it turns out that the magnitude of pre-proposal Unified Agenda
omissions is substantial, then a separate question arises about what explains
this observation. One possibility is that such behavior is strategic in
nature—that is, manipulated by agencies seeking to avoid the potential
costs of having their rules challenged by overseers. Agencies that reveal
107.
108.
109.
110.

See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
See McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 36, at 434–44.
5 U.S.C. § 553(a), (b)(3)(B) (2012).
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-126, FEDERAL RULEMAKING:
AGENCIES OFTEN PUBLISHED FINAL ACTIONS WITHOUT PROPOSED RULES 2 (1998). For those final
rules that are more consequential, it would be valuable to also analyze the relevant dynamics for final
rules, which we hope to address in future work.
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their contemplated regulatory actions increase the probability that political
monitors with divergent views will attempt to revise or otherwise block
their rules. Disclosing a rule lowers their monitoring costs, thus making it
easier for those with adverse interests to intervene in the agency’s proposed
rulemaking. A central hypothesis thus emerges: the more an agency expects
to have different preferences from its monitors, the more likely the agency
is to hide the regulation.
B. TESTING DISCLOSURE
To examine this hypothesis, this study relies on a novel dataset
containing over 30 years of proposed rules (1983–2014) published in the
Federal Register.111 Agencies are legally required to publish their proposed
rules in the Federal Register, unless providing actual or personal service on
potentially affected parties.112 These data are thus the most complete look
possible at the universe of proposed rulemakings. These data also yield a
number of background variables when available: the Federal Register
citation, docket number, RIN, date of publication, the name of the agency
responsible for the regulation,113 the length of the proposed rule (including
the preamble), as well as any cites to the Code of Federal Regulations or
the United States Code.
Earlier efforts to study agency activity, by contrast, have relied almost
exclusively on Unified Agenda entries to capture rulemaking behavior.114
However, most users have acknowledged—and various studies (including
this one) confirm—that these data are incomplete.115 Because Agenda
111. This window of analysis corresponds to another dataset created with regard to the Unified
Agenda, which also begins in 1983.
112. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (“General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual
notice thereof in accordance with law.”).
113. Extracting the names is a more challenging task than it sounds as agencies do not always
report their names in a standard fashion. For example, the National Park Service sometimes lists itself
as the agency, and other times also reports its parent agency, the Department of Interior. We isolate the
text where agencies typically report their name and contact information, and from this text attempt to
identify the agency name. However, these areas of text do not always allow us to recover the name of
the responsible agency. If we cannot recover the name of the agency, or if the agency is a minor issuer
of rules, we designate the agency as “other”. As explained below, this is a more challenging task than it
sounds, and we cannot recover the name of the responsible agency for all rules.
114. See supra sources cited note 41.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 11–15. See also Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the
Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 L.
CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 198 n.41 (Spring 1994) (noting that his investigation into the quality of the
Unified Agenda data was “sufficiently disappointing that [he did] not pursue[] the analysis on a more
‘scientific’ basis”); O’Connell, supra note 40, at 927 n.108 (“[The] Unified Agenda data are not perfect;
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entries are self-reported, they are susceptible to human error. Agencies and
administrations may also omit data for the strategic reasons we suggest.
This incompleteness raises questions about the validity of earlier empirical
research relying on the Unified Agenda,116 but also presents new research
opportunities. The fact that agencies likely self-report imperfectly to the
Unified Agenda allows an examination of the conditions under which an
agency opts to expose its regulatory actions to public view, and whether
such behavior is strategic or benign.
As an initial overview, the Federal Register data suggest that
administrative agencies published a total of 65,833 proposed rules over this
30-year period.117 Although it was not always possible to match these
proposed rules with the identity of the issuing agency, the remaining 86
percent of proposed rules indicate that a disproportionately select number
of agencies issue rulemaking proposals. Specifically, the Department of
Transportation is the most prolific agency by a considerable margin—
issuing over 20 percent of all proposed rules in the series. Four other
agencies issued over 3,000 proposals over the relevant period: the EPA
with just over 9,000 proposed rules; the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) with just over 6,000 proposed rules; and the
Departments of Interior and Agriculture with roughly 3,000 and 4,000
proposed rules, respectively. Combined, these 5 agencies produced a
remarkable 58 percent of all proposed rules.
1. Agenda Underreporting
The first descriptive question that arises is the extent to which
agencies self-report their anticipated proposed rules to the Unified Agenda.
A resulting methodological challenge is to construct a measure of agency
disclosure. Because the focus here is on the pre-proposal period, the
relevant outcome of interest is the extent to which agencies include their
pre-proposal regulatory activities in the Unified Agenda—that is, how
often do agencies inform the public of notices of proposed rulemaking that
they later issue?

they need confirmatory research.”).
116. In fact, only about 31 percent of NPRMs in our dataset appear in the Unified Agenda at any
stage of the rulemaking process—including completed action reports—before or after the NPRM
appears in the Federal Register.
117. As explained in the Appendix, we sought to cull from the dataset a variety of Federal
Register notices that announce something other than a rulemaking; for instance, notices of public
hearings, notices of petitions, notices of inquiry, and so on. The Appendix details our extensive efforts
in this regard, including our attempts to validate our data.
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To investigate this question, we obtained machine-readable versions
of the Unified Agenda from the General Services Administration.118 We
then determined which of the entries in the Agenda related to rulemaking
efforts that both produced a proposed rule published in the Federal Register
and appeared in the Agenda beforehand.119 To do so, we used a variety of
automated text-based efforts to associate and link the proposed rules. These
efforts were then checked against a random sample of 200 entries coded by
research assistants. This task required the development of a database of
proposed rules from the Federal Register, another dataset of Unified
Agenda entries, and a method of relating entries between the sources.
Appendix B describes these approaches in further detail. These efforts
allowed the identification of proposed rules for which the Agenda put the
public on early notice.
The data reveal some stark figures. As an initial matter, between 1983
and 2014, the Unified Agenda reports contained a total of at most 18,303
entries during the pre-proposal stage that eventually resulted in a proposed
rule in our data.120 By comparison, as noted above, there were about 65,833
118. These data consist of potentially several entries for a single rule, as identified by the RIN. For
example, the same rule might have a Unified Agenda entry at the time it is proposed, the time it is
finalized, and then again another entry as a “completed action” following finalization. See Appendix for
details on data processing.
119. Specifically, we first develop a comprehensive Agenda dataset that retains the last entry
available for each RIN; this will often, but not always, be at the “completed action” stage of the
rulemaking process. These last-in entries supply the dates, rule abstracts, Federal Register citations, and
the like that we use in the analysis below. Then, for each RIN in this Agenda dataset, we determine and
record the earliest stage at which it appeared in the Unified Agenda (pre-proposal, proposal, and so on).
This latter variable informs us of whether the rule appeared on the Agenda at the proposal stage or
earlier.
120. We arrive at this estimate in the following way. First, the Agenda reports a total of 26,806
proposed rules over the series. However, we only find matches for 19,848 of these entries in the Federal
Register. That leaves 6,958 “orphan” entries, that is, entries that are reported by agencies as proposed
rules but that lack a match in an actual published proposed rule. These entries may be orphans for one
of two reasons: 1) agencies placed these entries on the Agenda as proposed rules, but they were never
actually proposed, whether due to a change in priorities or because they never intended to propose them
in the first place; 2) alternatively, our mapping method, detailed in Appendix B, may be too inaccurate
to match the agenda entries to actual proposed rules published in the Federal Register, despite their
existence. Under these circumstances, we proceed conservatively by assuming that all of the orphan
Agenda entries, almost 7,000 of them, in fact eventually became proposed rules, and that our mapping
method simply could not detect them.
Our next task is to identify how many of the rules reported by agencies as proposed rules
were published in the Agenda before promulgated in the Federal Register. The issue here is that
agencies often self-report a rule as a proposed rule after publication has already occurred. By comparing
the relevant dates, as detailed in Appendix A, we find that only 11,345 of nonorphan entries in the
Agenda entry preceded the date the proposed rule appeared in the Federal Register. We cannot
determine whether the 6,958 orphan entries were disclosed before publication given that there is no
matching Federal Register entry. Therefore, once again, we proceed conservatively by assuming that all
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proposed rules published in the Federal Register. Simply placing these
figures side-by-side reveals that agencies dramatically underreport their
activity in the Agenda. In particular, agencies appear to report about 28
percent of their proposed rules to the Unified Agenda before they appear in
the Federal Register.121 Put differently, about 72 percent of proposed
rules—on the order of 50,000 since 1983—have been sprung on the public
for the first time in the Federal Register. Many of these rules were likely
promulgated after considerable periods of development and consultation
with regulatory insiders.
While the sheer magnitude of nondisclosure may be disconcerting,
one might nevertheless wonder about the nature of the undisclosed
proposed rules. If the vast majority are simply informational, ministerial, or
otherwise routine in nature, their absence on the Unified Agenda may not
be worrisome. Indeed, many of the proposed rules in our main dataset are
arguably minor including, for example, Airworthiness Directives from the
Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”).122 Airworthiness Directives are
legally enforceable regulations issued by the FAA to correct an unsafe
condition in a product and thus have limited scope.123 Based on the titles of
the proposed rules, roughly 9,000 of the 65,000 proposed rules in the
dataset—some 14 percent of the total—are Airworthiness Directives.124

of them were indeed published in the Agenda before Federal Register publication.
These calculations result in a fairly generous estimate of 18,303 Agenda entries that were
disclosed before Federal Register publication (11,345 known disclosed entries plus 6,958 orphaned
entries). This estimate is generous in the sense that the conservative assumptions regarding the
orphaned entries are very strong. In reality, many of these orphaned entries likely did not lead to an
eventual proposed rule, or if they did, were likely not reported to the Unified Agenda before the
associated rule was proposed. See infra Appendix B.
121. The numerator reflects the number of Unified Agenda entries that we were able to match to
our population of proposed rules that had an Agenda publication date prior to the NPRM date. This
measure could overstate the degree of underreporting in a few ways. If the agency fails to record a
citation in the Agenda entry for the NPRM, or does so incorrectly, our data would not be able to match
the Agenda entry to a proposed rule in the Federal Register. See Appendix A (providing further details).
In addition, if agencies issue multiple NPRMs, this may lead to an overstated rate of underreporting
since only one NPRM is matched to each Unified Agenda rulemaking entry. However, this issue is
mitigated by the Agenda’s observation that, based on our calculations, only 1.3 percent of rulemaking
efforts with at least one NPRM feature more than one NPRM. As one bound on the combined sources
of error, even if one relies solely on the Agenda’s self-reported characterizations of rulemaking stage
rather than the dates of publications—we find only about 18,000 prenotice NPRMs listed in the
Agenda, implying a reporting rate of roughly 30 percent. The true reporting rate is likely somewhere
between these two figures. See id.
122. See Airworthiness Directives (ADs) – Current Only, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (June 22, 2015),
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/airworthiness_directives/.
123. Id.
124. This assessment is based on calculations performed on the dataset developed in this paper.
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On the other hand, if some of the missing rules are politically salient
or otherwise have substantial effect, then strategic nondisclosure is more
troubling. It is clear that at least some of the nondisclosed rules fall into
these categories of concern. Consider, for example, a proposed rule on
country-of-origin labeling for meat cuts, estimated to impact over 7,000
firms and numerous consumers.125 Country-of-origin labeling has been a
contentious issue for years, with supporters arguing that it enables
consumer choice, and detractors claiming that the labels are costly and
misleading barriers to trade.126 Thus, one would expect the public to be
interested in relevant regulatory developments. The Department of
Agriculture (“USDA”), however, did not disclose that it was working on a
new proposal before its promulgation.127 To the contrary, the agency issued
the proposed rule shortly after an adverse World Trade Organization
ruling,128 and the new regulation required labels to “specify the production
steps of birth, raising, and slaughter of the animal from which the meat is
derived” in each country of origin.129 It also revised coverage definitions
and prohibited the commingling of certain commodities of different
origins.130 Importantly, when USDA issued the final rule, the agency did
not materially alter any of these provisions,131 thereby illustrating the
importance of the policy choices made at the proposed rule stage.
At the same time, many other examples of nondisclosed food labeling
125. Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and
Farm-Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and
Macadamia Nuts, 78 Fed. Reg. 15645, 15645–52 (proposed Mar. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R.
pts. 60, 65).
126. See Dan Mitchell, Study: Country-of-Origin Labels Don’t Hurt Beef Trade, FORTUNE (Feb.
2, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/02/02/country-of-origin-labels-beef/.
127. See Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat,
Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Macadamia Nuts, Ginseng, etc., REGINFO,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaSimpleSearch (enter RIN “0581-AD29” and hit “Search”)
(last visited Apr. 14, 2016). To see this, note that the Spring 2013 Unified Agenda was published on
July 23, 2013, well after the March 12, 2013 publication date of the NPRM, and indeed after the May
24, 2013 publication date of the final rule. See Spring 2013 Unified Agenda, 78 Fed. Reg. 44200
(2013).
128. Id.
129. Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and
Farm-Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and
Macadamia Nuts, 78 Fed. Reg. 15645, 15646 (2013).
130. Id. at 15645–46.
131. Compare Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat,
Wild and Farm-Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans,
Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, 78 Fed. Reg. 31367 (May 24, 2013) (to be codified 7 C.F.R. pts. 60,
65), with Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and
Farm-Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and
Macadamia Nuts, 78 Fed. Reg. 15645, 15645–52.
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regulations abound—pertaining to claims, for instance, regarding coronary
heart disease132 and “healthy” sodium level assertions.133 Beyond labeling
regulations is a diverse set of other missing proposed rules likely to be of
public interest. They include, for example, critical habitat and threatened
species determinations,134 Affordable Care Act regulations relating to small
businesses and health care exchanges,135 and even the EPA’s high-profile
greenhouse gas endangerment finding.136 None of these proposed rules
were disclosed in the Unified Agenda before their promulgation.137
A more systematic approach to understanding the character of rules
missing from the Agenda involves taking a random sample from the larger
dataset and manually inspecting this random sample. Standard sampling
theory suggests that this exercise is informative.138 Accordingly, we
randomly selected 200 rules from our dataset in the post-1994 part of the
series, after Executive Order 12,866 was issued; the focus is therefore on
the period for which the “significance” determination exists.139We then
read the 200 proposed rules to arrive at a sense of what they contain,
inspecting also whether they appear in the Unified Agenda.
132. Food Labeling: Health Claims; Soluble Fiber from Certain Foods and Risk of Coronary
Heart Disease, 72 Fed. Reg. 5367 (proposed Feb. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
133. Food Labeling; Nutrient Content Claims, Definition of Sodium Levels for the Term
"Healthy," 70 Fed. Reg. 56828 (proposed Sept. 29, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
134. See, e.g., Designation of Critical Habitat for the Beringia Distinct Population Segment of the
Bearded Seal (RIN: 0648-BC55); Designation of Critical Habitat for the Arctic Ringed Seal (RIN:
0648-BC56); Listing Gouania hillebrandii as an Endangered Plant and Determining Its Critical Habitat
(RIN: 1018-YB20); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Proposed Endangered Status and
Critical Habitat for the Amargosa Vole (RIN: 1018-YB32); Determine Eriogonum Pelinophilum to Be
an Endangered Species and to Designate Its Critical Habitat (RIN: 1018-YB74). To access these
proposed rules, search the corresponding RIN number on Search of Agenda/Regulatory Plan, REGINFO,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaSimpleSearch.
135. See, e.g., Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Small Business Health
Options Program (SHOP) (RIN: 0938-AR76); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;
Establishment of the Multi-State Plan Program for the Affordable Insurance Exchanges (RIN: 3206AN12) ; Annual Eligibility Determinations for Exchange Participation and Insurance Affordability
Programs; Health Insurance Issuer Standards Under the Affordable Care Act (RIN: 0938-AS32). To
access these proposed rules, search the corresponding RIN number on Search of Agenda/Regulatory
Plan, REGINFO, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaSimpleSearch.
136. See Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Apr. 24, 2009).
137. That is, our search of the relevant databases did not reveal that they were disclosed before
publication in the Federal Register.
138. Just as taking a poll of likely voters helps gauge the thinking of the electorate, so too can
sampling observations from our dataset help us understand what it contains. This analysis can also help
to motivate further inquiries.
139. President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 on September 30, 1993. See Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012).

2016]

STRATEGIC RULEMAKING DISCLOSURE

761

Most of the proposed rules—113 of the 200—come from the FAA, the
EPA, or the FCC. Many of these proposed rules have an adjudicatory
feeling to them, along the lines of the FAA’s Airworthiness Directives.
Technically, these agency actions are rulemakings, but they are of limited
applicability. Corroborating this assessment, one informative, though
imperfect, metric of regulatory scope is that the average length of proposed
rules from these 3 agencies in our sample is 3,800 words. By comparison,
the average length of proposed rules from other agencies is about 8,000
words. Very few of the proposed rules from these 3 agencies, only about 10
out of 113, appear in the Agenda.
Many OIRA-reviewed “significant” rules also do not make it into the
Unified Agenda. Significant rules, recall, are defined by executive order as
those regulatory actions “likely to result in a rule” that meets at least one of
several criteria, most notably raising “novel legal or policy issues” or
having “an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.”140 This
latter subset of rules is commonly characterized as “economically
significant.”141 Economically significant and significant rules are
essentially those regulations that are of most interest to elected officials like
the president or legislators. They are among the most publicly salient. Of
the 165 proposed rules promulgated by executive agencies in this sample,
13 were significant. Less than half—6 of 13—appeared in the Unified
Agenda prior to publication.142 That said, note that the standard error on
this estimated reporting rate is large for this subset of significant rules:
roughly 14 percentage points. Nevertheless, the broader point here is that a
nontrivial proportion of significant proposed rules likely do not appear in
the Unified Agenda prior to publication in the Federal Register.
A broader examination of significant rules—now using a more
comprehensive, but unfortunately still-imperfect, dataset of OIRA-revised
significant rules—further confirms that likely-noteworthy regulations are
not reported.143 Figure 2 reports the proportion of proposed economically
140. Id. See also 3 C.F.R. §§ 641–642. For a discussion of how OIRA treats this determination,
see Sunstein, supra note 104.
141. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. §§ 645–646 (1994). Circular A-4, in turn, states that
“Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to conduct a regulatory analysis for economically
significant regulatory actions as defined by Section 3(f)(1).” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Circular
A-4: To The Heads of Executive Agencies and Establishments, Regulatory Analysis, WHITE HOUSE
(Sept. 17, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4.
142. Some proposed rules appear in the Agenda, but after they first appeared in the Federal
Register. A total of 9 out of 13 appear in the Agenda at some point in the lifecycle of the rule.
143. In order to identify the complete set of significant rules, we initially attempted to isolate and
analyze text around mentions of “12,866” in the proposed rules’ preambles, but were only able to
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significant and significant rules that appeared in the Unified Agenda before
publication. The data shown in the figure’s left panel reveal that, on
average, only about 70 percent of significant proposed rules appear in the
Unified Agenda at the proposed rule stage or earlier. In other words, about
30 percent of the significant rules proposed in our time period were not
disclosed before publication. This exercise largely corroborates the findings
in other studies, which indicate that a substantial portion of significant
proposed rules appear in the Unified Agenda.144 Focusing on the
economically significant rules—that is, those rules with estimated annual
economic impact of $100 million or greater—one sees roughly the same
pattern, as shown in the right panel of Figure 2. The reporting rate for these
rules is now slightly higher at about 75 percent.

recover about 50 significant proposed rules per year. This figure is roughly a quarter of the amount one
would expect based on counts provided by the RISC. See Review Counts, REGINFO,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchInit?action=init (using this database, the normal year
shows roughly 200 “significant” proposed rules reviewed by OIRA). As a result, we instead turned to a
separate dataset of significant rules reviewed by OIRA. In relying on the OIRA review data for the
population of significant rules, this analysis adopts the same approach as Curtis Copeland. See
COPELAND, UNIFIED AGENDA PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at 17–19. This approach unfortunately has
two main drawbacks. First, agencies do not always promulgate draft proposed rules reviewed by OIRA.
Second, when determining whether the proposed rule appeared in the Agenda prior to the Federal
Register, we must rely on how agencies report the “stage” of the rulemaking process in the Agenda—
rather than comparing the date that the proposed rule appeared in the Federal Register and the date that
the rule first appeared in the Agenda. Many of these self-reported stages, however, may be erroneous.
144. Curtis Copeland’s study for the Congressional Research Service, for example, finds that
roughly 75 percent of the 231 significant proposed rules published in 2008 had a previous Agenda
entry. See COPELAND, UNIFIED AGENDA TRANSPARENCY, supra note 14, at 9. In a subsequent study for
the ACUS, Copeland finds that, for 88 significant proposed rules published by executive agencies in the
first half of 2014, about 94 percent were previously disclosed in the Unified Agenda. See id. at 38.

2016]

STRATEGIC RULEMAKING DISCLOSURE

763

FIGURE 2. Agency Reporting of Significant Rules
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Taking a step back, it is unsurprising that agencies report more
significant rules at higher rates given that political principals are likely to
become aware of these rules through other channels, such as fire alarm
oversight by regulatory insiders.145 So the gains to an agency from
shielding the development of such regulations are likely minimal, at least
as compared to the political costs of agenda noncompliance. At the same
time, the fact that agencies fail to report at least a quarter of their most
significant regulations is troubling. While it is possible that some of these
missing rules can be explained by agencies that may issue multiple
proposed rules for a single Agenda entry, this dynamic would still dilute
the initial notice’s specificity and effectiveness. Selective disclosure may
also enable agencies to distract monitors from particular rules.
145.

McNollgast¸ Administrative Procedures as Instruments, supra note 36, at 250.
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Even those hidden rules that are not OIRA-significant may also be
precisely the type where capture and other forms of regulatory misfeasance
are most likely. While these rules have a decent chance of sliding through
the system undetected by opponents, they may work substantial favors to
narrow special interests. The FAA’s Airworthiness Directives, for example,
can still be the subject of public controversy and affect thousands of
registered airplanes and their owners.146 Thus, it is important that less
connected and well-resourced stakeholders such as small businesses and
public interest groups have information about such regulatory
developments through the Unified Agenda or similar means.
To this end, it will now be useful to gain a better sense of where and in
which agencies these dynamics may be the most prevalent. Consulting the
main dataset once again,147 Figure 3 shows that reporting rates differ
widely among the agencies. The figure depicts the proportion of proposed
rules that each agency reports to the Unified Agenda: on the x-axis is the
proportion of all rules that are reported, and on the y-axis are the agencies.
The figure shows that the proportion of rules that appear in the Agenda
prior to finalization ranges from under 10 percent at approximately 10
agencies—including the FCC and Department of Homeland Security—to
over 70 percent at two agencies—the Railroad Retirement Board and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
It is not immediately clear what explains this enormous variation in
reporting behavior among agencies, but some fine-grained accounts are
plausible. Independent agencies appear somewhat less assiduous in their
reporting behavior; on average, their reporting rate is about 5 percentage
points lower. This finding may be due to the fact that OIRA’s review of
their Agenda entries is likely to be even more deferential than for executive
agencies. Situated in the Executive Office of the President, OIRA also
possesses less information about their regulatory activities. The office is
thus ill-equipped to serve as a check on Agenda completeness. Other
differences between agencies likely reflect some combination of agency
culture as well as difficult-to-quantify heterogeneity in the content of rules.
146. See, e.g., Regulatory Brief—FAA Replaces Controversial AD Proposal, Allows Alternative
Wing Spar Inspection for Aeronca/Bellanca/Champion Airplanes, AIRCRAFT OWNERS & PILOTS ASS’N,
http://www.aopa.org/Advocacy/Regulatory-,-a-,-Certification-Policy/Regulatory-Brief-FAA-replacescontroversial-AD-proposal-allows-alternative-wing-spar-inspection-for-Aeronca-Bellanca-Champion
(last visited Apr. 4, 2016) (“The proposed [airworthiness directive] would affect approximately 6,500
U.S. registered airplanes.”).
147. See Appendix B for a description of how we construct the main dataset.
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For this reason, agency fixed effects are included in some of the
specifications below.
FIGURE 3. Reporting Rates by Agency148
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2. Divided Government
While agencies substantially underreport their rulemaking activity to
the Unified Agenda, this section now asks whether this behavior reflects a
strategic choice by agencies to evade political oversight. The
underreporting, after all, might simply reflect benign considerations.
Unexpected events such as mine explosions or acts of financial
malfeasance may suddenly increase the public’s demand for regulatory
action, thus resulting in last-minute, expedited rulemakings not previously
placed on the Unified Agenda. Such unexpected events may also divert
internal resources that, in turn, prevent the timely preparation of agenda
items. Alternatively, poor management and intra-agency coordination
failures may also contribute to what amounts to incompetent but
148.

See Appendix C for a key mapping agency abbreviations to their full names.
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nonstrategic omission of entries. Furthermore, agency officials suggest that
the semiannual nature of the Unified Agenda also prevents them from
providing accurate and updated information.149 In light of these potential
explanations—strategic and benign—the answer cannot be determined
solely from theory, but must be empirically uncovered.
Recall that Congress possesses many tools with which it can attempt
to reverse or otherwise influence an agency’s rule.150 When a legislative
majority has different preferences than that of the agency, it can require the
agency to engage in expensive oversight hearings, threaten or impose
budget cuts, and even curtail the agency’s authority.151 It may also
eventually attempt to overturn the regulation through the Congressional
Review Act, which, if successful, will similarly impose costs and thwart
the agency’s preferences.152 Strategic agencies will be less likely to disclose
their regulatory activities under these circumstances. By hiding their
regulatory activity, agencies can shorten the amount of time that interest
groups and monitors have to learn about and engage with the proposed rule
before it is finalized.153
One straightforward method for testing this hypothesis is to examine
agency reporting behavior during periods of unified and divided
government—that is, when the president and at least one house of Congress
are from different political parties. Because agencies are generally part of
the executive branch and because their leaders and chairmen are appointed
by the president, agencies are more likely to align with the party of the
president.154 Thus, when at least one house of Congress is controlled by an
opposing political party, it is more likely to be hostile to the preferences of
the administrative agency. Under these circumstances, strategic agencies
will be less likely to disclose their regulatory activities.
The analysis indeed finds that the probability that a proposed rule
appears in the Unified Agenda decreases by roughly 4 percentage points
during periods of divided government, as reported in the first column of the
left panel of Table 1 below. In other words, when the president and
149.
150.
151.

COPELAND, UNIFIED AGENDA PROPOSALS, supra note 11, 95–98.
See Beermann, supra note 101 and accompanying text.
For a classic work on congressional oversight, see generally JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A
WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (2001).
152. See Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012).
153. McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 36, at 434–44; Gersen & O’Connell, supra
note 21, at 1163 (Strategic agency behavior “can allow the monitored to choose the monitors”).
154. See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So-Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and
the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 460–61 (2008) (finding empirical evidence of
notable presidential control over even independent agencies due to increased ideological partisanship).
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Congress are from different political parties, an agency’s reporting rate
drops by about 4 percentage points. This result is statistically significant at
any conventional level. Although the magnitude of the decline may sound
small, recall that, on average, agencies appear to report only about 28
percent of their NPRMs to the Unified Agenda.

TABLE 1. Unified Agenda Reporting: Executive and Independent Agencies
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Nevertheless, one might wonder to what extent the observed strategic
behavior pertains to the most significant rules. It is again possible, after all,
that this result is mainly driven by small or ministerial rules. While
previously discussed data limitations unfortunately do not permit a precise
answer,155 one can attempt to examine this question by using a rough proxy
of significance like rule length. More specifically, consider a set of
nonsignificant rules with limited impact like the FAA Airworthiness
Directives. The average number of words in an FAA Airworthiness
Directive is about 2,300, with a standard deviation of about 1,600 words.156
Thus, rules above 5,000 words are unlikely to be FAA Airworthiness
Directives or similarly minor rules; indeed, over 98 percent of
Airworthiness Directives have fewer than 5,000 words. If one zeroes in on
longer proposed rules of 5,000 words or more—as shown in the first
column of Table 1’s right panel—the effect of divided government on
reporting almost doubles to roughly 7 percentage points.
This strategic effect would be expected to be even stronger for
agencies controlled to a greater extent by the president. Indeed, some
existing evidence suggests that agencies under more presidential control
exhibit greater sensitivity to presidential electoral cycles.157 To test this
view, it is useful to now repeat the analyses above, but conduct them
separately for independent and executive agencies.158 Consider first the
results relating to executive agencies, over which the president exerts
greater control, as shown in the second column of Table 1: the left panel
again reflects all proposed rules, while the right panel reflects longer
proposed rules. Here, the reporting rate is about 4 percentage points lower
for all rules and about 8 percentage points lower for longer rules during
periods of divided government.
Moreover, as evident from the third column in Table 1, it appears that
155. See supra text accompanying note 143.
156. That is, if we use the titles of the proposed rules to determine which ones are Airworthiness
Directives, we find that such identified proposed rules have an average of about 2,300 words.
157. See Stiglitz, supra note 35.
158. The relative independence of an agency from presidential control rests along a continuum
rather than as a simple binary distinction between independent agencies and executive agencies. Indicia
of independence could include statutory removal protections, a multimember structure, partisan balance
requirements, budget and congressional communication authority, litigation authority, as well as
adjudication authority. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 772–73 (2013). For the purposes of this Article,
Appendix C specifies which agencies we classify as “executive” and which agencies we classify as
“independent.” Essentially, we use the statutory definition of “independent regulatory agency”
contained in the Paperwork Reduction Act to generate a list of “independent” agencies and categorize
the remaining agencies as “executive.” See Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012).
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independent agency reporting rates are relatively insensitive to the
conditions of divided government or unified government. The magnitude of
the coefficient on divided government tends to be smaller relative to the
magnitude of the corresponding coefficient for executive agencies; the
coefficients on divided government are also not statistically significant at
conventional levels. The results from Table 1 therefore suggest that much
of the strategic behavior we identify derives from the behavior of executive
agencies. In other words, the agencies most controlled by the president and
likely to disagree with Congress during periods of divided government are
those that exhibit the most sensitivity to Congress’s partisan composition.
Independent agencies, by comparison, are less sensitive to conditions of
divided government.
Notice also that these regressions control for a number of factors one
might think relevant to reporting behavior. Notably, the regressions control
for the (log) length of the proposed rule, as well as for its “complexity,”
that is, whether the notice of proposed rulemaking refers to more than one
part of the Code of Federal Regulations. Agencies may have an incentive to
hide longer and more complex rules or, alternatively, may decide that the
benefits of doing so are minimal given that such rules are more likely to
come to the public’s attention through other means. As evident from Table
1, in almost all specifications, these variables return with large, statistically
significant, and positive coefficients, suggesting that agencies are actually
more likely to disclose longer and more complex rules.159 Insofar as these
characteristics reflect the more substantial nature of the rule, this pattern is
consistent with the discussion above. The regressions also control for
election years, but these all return with near-zero, not statistically
significant coefficients.
As another check on these results, it is useful to further probe this
relationship by examining intervals immediately around a switch in party
control of one or more houses of Congress. By isolating the analysis to
these discrete time periods, one can better control for the preferences and
culture of an administration, as well as for other unobservable factors that
vary over time, such as rule composition. Because such factors remain
relatively stable within an administration, at least locally around the switch
in Congress, this alternative approach allows for a relatively cleaner
assessment of whether reporting behavior is responsive to divided
159. For example, the coefficients on “complexity” suggest that an agency is 4-7 percentage
points more likely to report a proposed rule if it refers to more than one part of the Code of Federal
Regulations.
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government.
Our dataset contains several midterm switches to or from divided
government. However, we will only observe a sharp change in behavior if
the shift in government comes as a surprise, because if the agencies
anticipate a shift in divided government, they can smoothly adapt their
behavior before the shift occurs. The most natural “surprise” shift in
divided government to consider is the one following the November 8, 1994
election, in which the Republicans took control of the House for the first
time in almost 50 years.160 A further advantage of this particular midterm
shift is that the Unified Agenda appeared late, on November 14, 1994, thus
creating the opportunity for agencies to react to the unexpected political
outcome.161
Each dot in Figure 4 represents the proportion of proposed rules that
have an entry in the Unified Agenda in a given week; the size of the dot is
proportional to the number of proposed rules issuing in that week. Thus, we
run an index reflecting the week of the administration on the x-axis (i.e.,
“4” means week 4 of the administration), and we plot the proportion of
proposed rules reported to the Unified Agenda that were on the y-axis. The
figure also contains two vertical dashed lines: the left line represents the
week of the election, and the right line represents the week of the
congressional transition. Although divided government did not actually
begin until January of 1995, the election resolved any uncertainty regarding
this fact several weeks earlier. One might therefore expect agency behavior
to shift around the election date rather than the date of congressional
transition. The analysis thus focuses on the interval around the election
date, plotting the trends before and after this date in solid gray lines.162
160. E.g., David W. Brady et al., The Perils of Presidential Support: How the Republicans Took
the House in the 1994 Midterm Elections, 18 POL. BEHAV. 345, 362 (1996) (“The Republican takeover
of the House of Representatives in 1994 caught most observers of elections by surprise.”). Another
obvious candidate for a surprise shift in divided government involves the 2001 switch in parties by
Senator Jim Jeffords. See Alison Mitchell, G.O.P. Senator Plans Shift, Giving Democrats Control in
Setback for White House, NY TIMES (May 24, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/24/
politics/24JEFF.html. However, that switch occurred so early in the Bush administration—just 4
months in—with appointments still underway, that agency officials had little time to develop their own
rules, suggesting that many of these rules represent carryover efforts from the previous administration.
161. Additional Government Publications: The Regulatory Plan and Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulations, U.S. GOV’T PUBL’G OFF. (Nov. 14, 1994) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.
action?collectionCode=GPO&browsePath=Unified+Agenda%2F1994&searchPath=Unified+Agenda%
2F1994&leafLevelBrowse=false&isCollapsed=false&isOpen=true&ancestors=root&packageid=GPOUA-1994-11-14&ycord=429 [hereinafter Regulatory Plan].
162. The solid gray lines represent locally weighted averages and smooth week-to-week
fluctuations to reveal systematic trends.
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FIGURE 4. A Midterm Shift to Divided Government

Proportion NPRMs Reported in Unified Agenda

Unified to Divided (Clinton 1996)

Week Index

The pattern in this figure is consistent with our main results.
Immediately before the 1994 election, the Clinton administration’s
agencies had reported roughly 30 percent of their proposed rules to a
previous edition of the Unified Agenda. In other words, prior to November
8, about 30 percent of agencies’ proposed rules had been previously
reported in some edition of the Unified Agenda up to that year’s spring
edition, which was published on April 25.163 By comparison, immediately
after the 1994 election, the percentage of anticipated rules appearing in the
Unified Agenda dropped by about 7 percentage points. Importantly, the fall
edition of the Unified Agenda that year was not issued in October as usual,
163.

Introduction to the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 20002 (1994).
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but rather on November 14—6 days after the election.164 Thus, the
immediate shift in reporting rates that followed after the election was more
likely due to behavioral changes with respect to the recent fall edition of
the Unified Agenda.
Another potential interpretation of this figure is that the change
instead reflects the fact that agencies adapted their proposed rules to
appease the Republican majority. Thus, the drop in the reporting rate comes
not from a lack of transparency, but rather from an increase in the number
of new proposed rules now designed to satisfy different congressional
overseers. These new proposed rules, the argument continues, could not
have been reported the previous spring nor in the fall due to a lag in
Agenda preparation. In this view, agencies are acting responsively, not
strategically.
While our data cannot definitively reject this alternative theory, we
believe the scenario is highly unlikely for two reasons. First, agencies are
generally unable to promulgate new proposed rules so quickly as to
produce a notable effect immediately after the election.165 Second, as
previously mentioned, the publication of the fall edition of the Unified
Agenda that year was nearly contemporaneous with the election. Because
agencies can revise Agenda items until the date of publication,166 they had
the ability to reduce the transparency of their regulatory efforts almost
immediately following the election. Put differently, though constrained by
Agenda entries they had submitted for previous Unified Agenda data calls,
agencies could choose not to disclose their continuing stream of proposed
rules on that year’s fall Agenda.167
164. See Regulatory Plan, supra note 162.
165. One challenge is that it is difficult to observe the date at which agencies “start” a rulemaking.
Nevertheless, one estimate for a sample of rules suggests that the regulatory development period, at
least for some rules, could be as long as 4 years. See West, Formal Procedures, supra note 1. While
there are surely shorter development periods for many rules, such efforts likely take longer than 6 days.
To further get a sense of magnitude, consider that the estimated duration between NPRM and final
action is a little more than a year. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political
Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 471, 513 (2011) (finding that, between the fall 1983 and the spring
2010, the average rulemaking took 462.79 days to complete, from NPRM to finalization).
166. As Copeland reports, agencies may revise their Unified Agenda entries, potentially until
shortly before the Agenda is published. COPELAND, UNIFIED AGENDA PROPOSALS, supra note 11, at
25–26.
167. As a sort of “placebo” test, we also examined midterm elections that did not result in a shift
in congressional control; here, we do not observe the same pattern of a postelection drop in reporting
rate.
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3. Intra-Executive Branch
Of course, administrative agencies are subject not only to
congressional, but also to presidential, oversight as well. Just as agencies
have policy disagreements with Congress, so too do they have them with
the president. As a result, it is reasonable to suppose that agencies would
attempt to hide their contemplated regulatory actions from the regulatory
agenda when they disagree with the sitting president on policy matters.168
Such behavior might make it more difficult for the president to monitor
agencies directly or indirectly through allied interest groups.
One countervailing consideration is that the president, as discussed,169
is able to oversee executive agencies through many channels not available
to Congress. Perhaps most importantly, the president has centralized the
review of executive agency rulemaking through OIRA. He also has access
to more informal means of influence and information through his
presidential appointees and a broader White House apparatus. To the extent
that these alternative devices of influence and information make it fruitless
for agencies to attempt to hide through nondisclosure on the Unified
Agenda, one might expect to see relatively attenuated results in the context
of executive branch oversight.
To test these competing hypotheses, it would be ideal to have a
measure of the preference divergence between each agency and the sitting
president for each year in our series. Unfortunately, no such measure exists
for the entire time period of our analysis.170 So our dataset relies on a
popular, but static, measure of agency preferences developed by Joshua
Clinton and David Lewis.171 These scores are based on experts’ ratings of
168. See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1755, 1803–04, 1809 (2013).
169. See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text.
170. Professors Bertelli and Grose produce perhaps the closest such measures. See generally
Anthony M. Bertelli & Christian R. Grose, The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point
Estimates for the Executive Branch and Congress, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 767 (2011) (developing ideal
point estimates for cabinet department heads from 1991 to 2004). However, Bertelli and Grose’s dataset
only covers the heads of cabinet departments and excludes all independent agencies, as well as the
EPA. Other time-variant measures of agency and presidential preferences are also available, but
currently yield estimates that similarly cover periods that are only a fraction of our 30-year dataset. See,
e.g., Alex Acs, Presidents and Their Regulatory Agencies: Pulling Back the Curtain on Policy
Disagreement (April 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors); Adam Bonica, Jowei
Chen & Tim Johnson, Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the
Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy, 10 Q.J. POL. SCI. 5 (2015); Jowei
Chen & Tim Johnson, Federal Employee Unionization and Presidential Control of the Bureaucracy:
Estimating Ideological Change in Executive Agencies, 101 J. THEORETICAL POL. 657 (2014).
171. Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency
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agency ideologies. Specifically, Clinton and Lewis survey a set of
academics who study the bureaucracy, as well as Washington D.C.-based
insiders, and record these individuals’ assessments of agency policy
dispositions. Under the Clinton-Lewis scores, a negative value indicates a
liberal agency, and a positive value indicates a conservative one. Our
analysis takes these Clinton-Lewis scores and then adjusts them according
to whether the president is a Democrat or Republican. If the president is a
Republican, the Clinton-Lewis scores are multiplied by negative 1, such
that higher values indicate more liberal agency preferences, and thus more
likely disagreement between agency and president. If the president is a
Democrat, the scores are left intact, such that higher values indicate more
conservative agency preferences, and again, more likely disagreement
between agency and president.
Table 1 above reports the results for this exercise. There, note that—
regardless of which set of rules or agencies we consider—the coefficient on
this measure for agency-president discord is essentially 0. This is true
whether or not agency fixed effects are included. These findings suggest
that there is little relationship between expected preference divergence and
agency reporting behavior. Greater agency-president disagreement, it
seems, is not associated with any change in agency disclosure. One
plausible explanation for this pattern is that agencies face few incentives to
hide their agendas from the president who enjoys so many other means to
obtain the same information from agencies, notably through political
appointees and OIRA review.172 Through political appointments, presidents
can ensure that central decisionmakers within agencies are unlikely to
adopt policies that diverge greatly from their preferred policies. Political
appointees also serve as bureaucratic informants who reduce the
informational advantages of the agencies. Likewise, through a series of
executive orders, presidents have effectively set up a parallel system of
administrative law, imposing a centralized review system on agencies
designed to keep abreast of the federal bureaucracy.173 OIRA itself also
reviews entries that agencies submit for the Unified Agenda.174 These
schemes make it less likely that agencies could surprise presidents with

Preferences, 16 POL. ANALYSIS 3, 4–5 (2008).
172. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 641 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2012).
173. Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 37–39 (1944).
174. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, About OIRA, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/oira/about (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
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fully formed regulations written after secret negotiations with select
interests.
***
In short, the empirical findings above highlight the magnitude of what,
until now, has been limited evidence that agencies are not complying with
the requirements of the Unified Agenda. Specifically, our data reveal that
agencies only disclose about 28 percent of their proposed rules before they
are promulgated. The remaining rules are sprung on the public for the first
time in the Federal Register, after which little can substantially change in
the final rule unless it is a “logical outgrowth” of the original proposals.175
It is true that many of the undisclosed rules are minor in nature, but our
data show that about 25 percent of OIRA-designated significant rules are
also likely to go unreported. Equally importantly, the data also suggest that
such behavior is strategic with respect to congressional, but not
presidential, oversight. These findings corroborate other empirical work
suggesting that agencies time the release of their decisions for when
Congress is out of session.176 Thus, despite congressional and executive
efforts to foster greater transparency for regulatory development, agencies
are evading legislative supervision. Consequently, the Unified Agenda does
not provide the public with the notice necessary to participate fully in the
rulemaking process.
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that our findings
cannot rule out some alternative explanations for these results. It is
possible, for example, that at least some of these effects are due not to
strategic choices by agencies under divided government, but rather to
strategic choices by the president. Because the president appoints agency
leaders and can review the Unified Agenda through OIRA, decisions not to
disclose may reflect executive attempts to raise the monitoring costs of
legislators or interest groups.177 In this sense, the Unified Agenda may
reflect a presidential management strategy.
Moreover, it is also difficult to disentangle precisely just how much
our results are due to strategic behavior as opposed to responsive changes
in the substance of the underlying proposed rules. Our focus on the local
period around a shift to divided government represents an effort to address
this issue, but it remains true that when new political realities arise,
agencies may eventually shift their rulemaking behavior to align with those
175.
176.
177.

See Beerman & Lawson, supra note 65, at 894.
See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 21, at 1183.
See id. at 1163, 1169–72, 1174–75.
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of their political overseers. Because the Unified Agenda is only published
twice a year, agencies may be unable to update their regulatory agendas
before publishing their proposed rules. Thus, some of what is actually
politically responsive behavior may misleadingly appear to be strategic.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The analysis thus far has been focused on the causes, and not the
consequences, of transparency. The findings tell us little about important
normative goals such as increasing public participation, much less of social
welfare. Salient inquiries, perhaps to be tackled in future work, include
whether greater rates of Unified Agenda disclosure result in regulations
with greater net benefits, more public comments, or higher litigation
probabilities. Without answers to these questions, the theoretical case for
transparency is mixed. On the one hand, transparency is essential to many
core democratic values: informing public debate, educating citizens, and
facilitating accountability within elected branches of government.178
Moreover, transparency facilitates input about and criticism of government
activities that can improve their efficiency or effectiveness.179 Access to
government data may also help inform private decisionmaking by
individual consumers or industry actors.180
At the same time, however, transparency also has potential costs.
Transparency could, for example, facilitate the disproportionate
participation of well-resourced groups that lobby for special interest
regulations.181 Disclosures can also harm national security or law
enforcement interests, both of which require confidentiality for diplomatic
or investigatory purposes.182 Additionally, leaked information may increase
frivolous legal liabilities or result in unjustified reputational harms. 183
Alternatively, the information could encourage involvement from illinformed parties who demand unproductive and resource-intensive
meetings.184 Transparency could also hinder internal agency deliberations,
which may chill the candid discussions that are necessary when dealing
with particularly sensitive or highly uncertain issues.185 For example,
178. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 896–99 (2006).
179. Id. at 900.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 918–19.
182. Id. at 906–07.
183. Id. at 937.
184. See id. at 942.
185. Id. at 908. The story of the government in the Sunshine Act, for instance, is largely one of
unintended consequences. The Act, which required agencies composed of collegial bodies to hold open
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transparency might undermine collegial deliberations by forcing agency
officials to publicly posture during negotiations, resulting in breakdowns of
the policymaking process.186 In this manner, disclosures could end up
further politicizing administrative policymaking, harming important
domestic policy objectives.
As a result, inquiries about whether the disclosures required by the
Unified Agenda ultimately increase social welfare or otherwise facilitate
accountability remain open empirical questions. With that caveat in mind,
this Part explores what steps could be taken to improve the utility of the
Unified Agenda. Insofar as the stated objectives of the mechanism are to
allow for greater participation and planning, the question addressed here is
how the Unified Agenda might be reformed to better accomplish these
goals.
A. LEGISLATIVE REFORM?
Given our findings that executive branch agencies are less likely to act
strategically with respect to the president, the president has less incentive to
police Unified Agenda requirements. Congressional reforms are thus more
likely to be successful than executive branch efforts at improving preproposal disclosure. In particular, these findings lend empirical support to
recent legislative proposals aimed at requiring earlier public engagement
from agencies. Various congressional committees, for example, have
approved amendments to the APA that would mandate legally enforceable
prenotice reporting, such as advance notices of proposed rulemakings. The
Early Participation in Regulations Act considered in the Senate, for
example, would require agencies to publish advance notices of proposed
rulemaking for all major rules, defined in part as those expected to have an
impact of $100 million or more.187 In 2015, the House of Representatives
passed the Regulatory Accountability Act, which similarly requires
agencies to issue an advance notice of proposed rulemaking for important
rules, including basic information that resembles what agencies would
include in the Unified Agenda.188 Unlike the Unified Agenda, however, this

meetings or public responses when disposing of official business, undermined the ability of agency
officials to deliberate in a collegial way by forcing them to adopt a variety of inefficient workarounds.
See William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law—Three Examples as
an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 187–91 (2009).
186. For a seminal paper making this point, see generally David Stasavage, Open-Door or ClosedDoor? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining, 58 INT’L ORG. 667 (2004).
187. Early Participation in Regulations Act of 2015, S. 1820, 114th Cong. (2015).
188. See Regulatory Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 185, 114th Cong. (2015); Final Vote
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early warning procedure would be judicially reviewable to the same extent
as the other APA rulemaking procedures.
While partisan wrangling is likely to prevent the bill from passing, 189
its plausible viability spurred 84 law professors to pen a letter urging the
House to vote against the bill.190 With respect to the advance notice
requirement, the letter argued that there was “no justification” for the
requirement, since the existing requirement for agencies to submit
regulatory agendas contained much of the same information.191 However,
our findings suggest that this assumption is questionable, and that agencies
are acting strategically with respect to congressional oversight. Such
findings could thus bolster the wisdom of statutory advance notice
requirements.
That said, a judicially reviewable requirement to issue a pre-proposal
notice raises several countervailing concerns. For instance, an obvious
worry is that an agency that faces a pressing public policy problem may not
be able to both respond to the problem in a timely way and signal its
regulatory intent in advance of the proposed rule. One solution to this
problem, however, is to provide for a “good cause” exemption from the
requirement to issue a prenotice notice, with the exemption itself subject to
judicial review. Another concern is that additional rulemaking requirements
would unduly ossify the regulatory process.192 Though rigorously studying
the hypothesis is difficult,193 existing efforts to examine this hypothesis
have at least suggested that rulemaking continues at a good rate despite the

Results for Roll Call 28, H.R. 185, 114th Cong. (2015) [hereinafter Final Vote Results].
189. Of the 250 votes in favor, all but 8 came from Republicans; all 175 nays came from
Democrats. See Final Vote Results, supra note 189. Indeed, since the 112th Congress (2011–2013),
there have been numerous congressional efforts to revise the APA or otherwise create new procedures
for agencies to follow. See, e.g., Achieving Less Excess in Regulation and Requiring Transparency Act
of 2014 (ALERRT Act of 2014), H.R. 2804, 113th Cong. (2014); Sound Regulation Act of 2014, S.
2099, 113th Cong. (2014); Regulatory Accountability and Economic Freedom Act of 2012, H.R. 4116,
112th Cong. (2012); Regulations From the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2011, H.R. 10, 112th
Cong. (2011); Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, H.R. 3010, 112th Cong. (2011); Financial
Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S. 1615, 112th Cong. (2011); Closing Regulatory Loopholes
Act of 2011, S. 1530, 112th Cong. (2011).
190. Regulatory Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 185, 114th Cong. (2015).
191. Letter from Alfred C. Aman, Professor of Law, Ind. Univ., to the Honorable Bob Goodlatte,
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 12, 2015) (on file with
authors).
192. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992).
193. The clear difficulty is that it is not obvious how to think about the counterfactual baseline.
That is, we observe agencies produce X number of rules, but we have no credible way to determine how
many rules would have been produced absent the relevant rulemaking requirements.
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imposition of such procedural requirements.194
Congress could also reassert its ability to monitor regulatory
development through statutory amendment in other ways. For instance,
Congress could pare back the common law gloss applied by courts
requiring a “logical outgrowth” between the proposed and final rules, and
thus help to reassert the notice-giving function of the proposed rule. Doing
so would ease the pressure on the Unified Agenda to serve the same
purpose. Courts have been using the logical outgrowth doctrine to police a
significant concern—the worry that final rules will be imposed in ways that
could not be anticipated by would-be commenters.195 The concern is that
agencies could keep their intended rules under wraps while proposing
something only tenuously related to what they plan to release as the final
rule.196
At the same time, however, overly aggressive attempts to enforce this
connection will discourage agencies from learning from public comments
and responding accordingly. As it stands, some have rightly pointed out
that the logical outgrowth requirement is in tension with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.197 There, the Court held that procedural
requirements must come from the Constitution, from a statute, or from the
agency itself.198 Vermont Yankee thus prohibits courts from inventing and
imposing their own novel procedural requirements—a proscription that was
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015.199
Applying Vermont Yankee to the logical outgrowth doctrine highlights
the doctrine’s tenuous foundations against the backdrop of the APA.200 By
194. See Yackee & Yackee, Testing Ossification, supra note 34, at 1415 (“[E]vidence that
ossification generally is either a serious or widespread problem is mixed at best, and appears relatively
weak overall.”); Yackee & Yackee, Ossified, supra note 41, at 261–62, 268–80 (finding little evidence
of ossification using dataset ranging from 1983 to 2006).
195. See Beermann & Lawson, supra note 65, at 895.
196. See id.
197. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 519 (1978);
Beerman & Lawson, supra note 65, at 898–99.
198. Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 518–19, 524.
199. See Perez v. Mort. Bankers Ass’n., 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015) (overruling the paralyzed
veteran doctrine on the grounds that it was “contrary to the clear text of the APA’s rulemaking
provisions, and it improperly imposes on agencies an obligation beyond the ‘maximum procedural
requirements’ specified in the APA”) (quoting Vt. Yankee, 435 U. S. at 524).
200. Consider the sparse text of the APA: to promulgate rules, agencies must publish in the
Federal Register a “general notice of proposed rulemaking” that includes 1) “a statement of the time,
place, and nature of public rule making proceedings”; 2) “reference to the legal authority under which
the rule is proposed”; and 3) “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
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requiring agencies to provide what amounts to the actual terms or substance
of the rule, as well as supporting evidence justifying them, courts have
arguably expanded rulemaking requirements beyond the text of the APA
itself. Instead, Congress could clarify that agencies should only be required
to provide a description of the regulatory issues under consideration, rather
than the precise text of the regulation or the substance of every regulatory
detail at the proposal stage. Otherwise, the prevailing reading of
section 553 effectively reads out the “subjects and issues” alternative that
Congress made available to agencies.201 Reestablishing this more minimal
notice requirement would restore the function of the notice-and-comment
process as a forum for genuine regulatory development with the broader
public. Doing so could ameliorate the problems of political oversight that
our empirical results identify.
B. PERSISTING PUZZLES
While some of the above reforms could help Congress reestablish a
tool for earlier legislative and public regulatory involvement, two related
puzzles—raised, but not resolved here—remain. The first is why Congress
has yet to pass any of the many bills requiring some kind of reviewable
pre-proposal notification. The second is why Congress passed the RFA
requiring regulatory agendas for small business interests without making
the mandate judicially enforceable.202 The two inquiries are related in that
they raise the broader question of whether Congress possesses the incentive
and institutional capacity, going forward, to impose legal costs for agency
failures to disclose.
One potential explanation for the persisting lack of a legally
enforceable agenda requirement is simply that of legislative naiveté.
Perhaps statutory drafters assumed that agencies would comply with the
statute given the potential political costs of avoidance. Alternatively,
perhaps they believed that the SBA would be able to vigorously enforce the
subjects and issues involved.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1)–(3) (2012). Agencies must then give the public an
opportunity to publicly comment on the proposal, after which they must publish a “concise general
statement of . . . basis and purpose” with the final rule. Id. § 553(c). In this manner, the APA’s text
imposes minimal requirements on the agency’s notice of proposed rulemaking. That notice must only
contain either the “terms or substance” of the rule or else a mere “description of the subjects and issues
involved.” Id. § 553(b)(3).
201. Id. § 553(b)(3).
202. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-3545, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified as amended
at U.S.C. § 611(a)(1) (2012)) (“Except as otherwise provided in [an inapplicable subsection], any
determination by an agency concerning the applicability of any of the provisions of this chapter to any
action of the agency shall not be subject to judicial review.”).
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requirements, even without the threat of judicial review.203 Our results
suggest that both of these assumptions have proven misplaced. Similarly,
Congress may have also expected the mandates to be enforced by the
executive branch more broadly, given that it had issued executive orders on
the subject. However, this expectation preceded the rise of the apparatus of
presidential review—and the many other avenues presidents have to gain
information about regulatory development. Because the White House and
OIRA can now retain this information informally, the president no longer
needs to enforce the Unified Agenda requirements to meet his
informational needs.
Another possible account for why agenda requirements remain
underenforced relates to technological limitations. Recall that the Unified
Agenda is currently required to be published semiannually, likely due in
part to the costs of executive branch coordination, as well as those
associated with printing and publication. As a result, the original drafters of
these requirements may have considered a legally enforceable disclosure
requirement to be impractical given the realities of rulemaking. Some
regulations must be formulated and issued in less than 6 months due to
exigent circumstances.204 Thus, it would unduly tie the hands of regulators
to require pre-proposal notice a half year in advance.
Considered dynamically, however, it is still curious why this state of
affairs has persisted, that is, why has Congress not acted in the face of
agency noncompliance to reassert the public’s ability to monitor regulatory
development? The empirical results here suggest that perhaps Congress
already has some of the regulatory information it desires: about threequarters of the most significant regulations from executive branch agencies
are disclosed. But this still leaves a quarter of significant regulations as
well as an indeterminate number of important rules from independent
agencies off the legislative radar.
One possibility is that—for the swath of rules not reported in the
Agenda—Congress is content to conduct oversight after the agency has
promulgated the notice. However, this view ignores the hardening of the
notice of proposed rules under the logical outgrowth and other doctrines, so
that it is difficult for agencies to revise proposed rules once published. Of
203. See 5 U.S.C. § 602(b) (“Each regulatory flexibility agenda shall be transmitted to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment, if any.”).
204. Id. § 602(d) (“Nothing in this section precludes an agency from considering or acting on any
matter not included in a regulatory flexibility agenda, or requires an agency to consider or act on any
matter listed in such agenda.”).
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course, agencies might withdraw a proposed rule, revise it, and re-propose
it. But all of this is costly relative to simply influencing the agency to revise
the rule prior to the time it is proposed, when the agency might be more
susceptible to congressional prodding. Thus, as stressed by McNollgast,205
for legislators to be successful, it is important that they intervene early in
the rulemaking process, before coalitions have mobilized in support of the
agency’s rule. Nevertheless, individual congressional committees may have
diverging priorities or face other collective action problems that result in a
status quo bias. Despite the value of earlier intervention to specific
committees, individuals on these committees may not be able to influence
the legislative agenda of Congress as a whole.
Another possible explanation for why Congress has not amended the
ineffective Unified Agenda regime is that legislators are captured by the
very regulatory insiders that benefit from excluding outsiders from the
rulemaking process. In other words, because early disclosure grants interest
groups more time to influence agency policymaking, those groups that can
influence agencies through more informal channels lobby congressional
staff not to revisit regulatory agenda requirements.
Yet another hypothesis worth considering—the simplest, and perhaps
most correct—is that revision to administrative procedures is effectively
precluded by legislative gridlock. Under prevailing legislative conditions, a
substantial majority of members might prefer to enact revisions to the
APA, only to have their wishes frustrated by any one of the many veto
points in the legislative process. Indeed, one substantial veto point is the
president himself, who is unlikely to accede to revisions that curtail his
authority or discretion. This is particularly true as the president can now
avail himself of modern tools of executive control and review, many of
which did not exist when Congress originally drafted and subsequently
revised the APA.206
Insofar as partisan gridlock is likely to persist—likely, in our view—
then perhaps other institutions like the ACUS are better positioned to nudge
reforms on behalf of the public more generally. Indeed, the ACUS has
recently proposed a number of sound recommendations regarding the
Unified Agenda, including suggestions that agencies engage in more
205. See McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments, supra note 36, at 258
(Procedures “ensure that agencies cannot secretly conspire against elected officials by presenting them
with a fait accompli, that is, a new policy with already mobilized supporters”); McNollgast, Structure
and Process, supra note 36, at 441 (“[W]hen an agency presents politicians with a fait accompli,
politicians may find it difficult, if not impossible, to respond.”).
206. See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
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automatic, realtime reporting on their websites as well as other digital
media.207 Such reforms would help to ameliorate the ability of agencies to
cite publication delays as a pretext for nondisclosure. Because of its unique
role in “bridging” internal agency actors with external parties, the ACUS
may help to facilitate changes from within agencies, should legislative or
executive efforts fall short.208
CONCLUSION
Some of the most critical decisions during the regulatory process are
made before the agency issues its proposed rule. Yet scholars and the
public alike know relatively little about this period. This Article has
examined the largely voluntary prenotice disclosures contained in the
Unified Agenda and found evidence of politically strategic behavior.
Agencies, and executive agencies in particular, notably decrease their
reporting rates in periods of divided government—periods in which they
likely face a hostile congressional oversight environment. Agencies indeed
appear to play “hide and seek” with the most important prenotice disclosure
regime currently available. The results are noteworthy because they suggest
that Congress is currently hobbled in its ability to monitor and influence
agencies’ regulatory development. The findings are also meaningful given
that common law amendments to the APA have constrained the ability of
agencies to revise proposed rules once they appear in the Federal Register.
This Article has thus identified some ways to help restore the function
of public comment as a genuine opportunity for transparent regulatory
development. Specifically, Congress could amend the APA to create
legally binding prenotice disclosure requirements. These provisions could,
for example, require agencies to report impending rules to the Unified
Agenda or issue advance notices of proposed rulemaking subject to judicial
review. Alternatively, statutory reforms could pare back the logical
outgrowth requirement or refine it in ways that reduce the incentive for
agencies to issue near-final rules as proposed rules. Ultimately, however,
we acknowledge that the theoretical normative case for transparency is
ultimately a mixed one. There is thus a need for further empirical work
regarding the extent to which disclosure affects various regulatory
outcomes.
207. See ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2015-1:
PROMOTING ACCURACY AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE UNIFIED AGENDA (2015).
208. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law, Public Administration, and the Administrative
Conference of the United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1536 (2015).
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Additional research questions remain. Future work, for example, could
extend the insights developed here to agency behavior with respect to final
rules: what factors explain an agency’s decision to disclose its plans to
finalize a rule and how do these dynamics differ from the pre-proposal
context, given that the proposed rule has already been published? In a
similar spirit, what consequences flow from being included or excluded
from the Agenda, either at the proposal or final stage? Do excluded rules
have different fates in congressional hearings or in postfinalization
litigation? Does the content of the rules themselves depend on whether they
are included in the Agenda? Finally, it may also be interesting to consider
how agencies engage substitute mechanisms of disclosure such as their
own websites, published requests for information, or announcements at
public meetings or conferences.
How agencies disclose their regulatory activities has important
implications for a number of administrative law’s animating concerns: who
gets access to the rulemaking process, how agencies are held accountable,
and which institutions are best situated to police regulatory behavior. With
a new dataset, this Article has undertaken an empirical examination of how
agencies report their rulemaking plans and found evidence suggesting that
such behavior may be strategic. Selective disclosure is thus a form of
bureaucratic autonomy meriting closer examination by scholars and
political overseers alike.
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE UNIFIED AGENDA ENTRY

APPENDICES

Source: OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Updated Standards for Labeling of
Pet Food, REGINFO, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?
pubId=201510&RIN=0910-AG09 (last visited Apr. 11, 2016).
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APPENDIX B: DATA COLLECTION
This appendix describes our data collection efforts. In essence, the
basic exercise involves (1) developing a universe of proposed rules culled
from the Federal Register; (2) creating a database of entries in the Unified
Agenda; and (3) finding a way to map between the two datasets.
After collecting machine-readable Federal Register entries from a
variety of sources, we first searched the action headings to remove “false”
proposed rules, that is, entries with variations of “proposed” in the title but
that had virtually no regulatory effect. These false positives included, for
example, notices of proposed hearings or public meetings, technical
corrections of proposed rules, and the like. To corroborate this effort, we
also tasked research assistants with reviewing 200 randomly selected
entries from our dataset by hand. This exercise suggested that the vast
majority of the entries in our dataset in fact represented proposed rules. Of
the 200 entries, the research assistants coded only 5 as being something
other than a proposed rule. Based on these numbers, we estimate that 97.5
percent of the entries in our Federal Register dataset capture proposed
rules, with a standard error on this estimate of 1.1 percentage points
(implying a 95 percent confidence interval of 95.3 percent to 99.6 percent).
In addition, without attempting to find proposed rules erroneously excluded
from our dataset based on action headings, this suggests that our dataset
erroneously includes some 4.7 percent of its entries; that is, some 4.7
percent of the entries in our dataset are not proposed rules for which we
should expect to find a Unified Agenda entry. These false inclusions will
generally lead us to underestimate the reporting rate. However, the
magnitude of this bias is not large. Conservatively using the lower bound of
the confidence interval above, this exercise suggests that we underestimate
the reporting rate by 4.9 percent (i.e., 1-1/.953). That is, for example, if our
estimated reporting proportion is 0.25, we can conservatively bound the
true reporting proportion at 0.26 (i.e., 0.25*1.049).
For the Unified Agenda database, we rely on XML files provided by
the RISC within the General Services Administration. A single rule might
have numerous entries in the Agenda, for example, one for the proposed
rule, one for the final rule, and one as a completed action report. For most
of the identifying information, we retain the last available entry for each
rule, where the rule is traced through its RIN. According to RISC, a RIN
consists of a four-digit agency code plus a four-character alphanumeric
code, assigned sequentially when a rulemaking is first entered into the
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database, which identifies the individual regulation under development.”209
The last available entry in the Unified Agenda is likely to contain the most
information about the rule’s Federal Register citations, up-to-date abstracts
of the rule, and the like.
Creating a mapping between these two datasets—the Federal Register
dataset of proposed rules and the set of Unified Agenda entries—posed
considerable challenges. The most obvious candidate for a mapping
between them is through the RIN, which should in theory be a unique
identifier that would allow us to trace the lifecycle of a rulemaking.
However, while the Unified Agenda fairly consistently contains RINs, most
entries in the Federal Register do not report them. Instead, Federal Register
entries tend to include docket numbers, if they include any identifier. But
these docket numbers may change over the lifetime of a rule. Moreover, the
Unified Agenda only lists docket numbers in a highly inconsistent and
incomplete fashion. Thus, while we use RINs to match entries where
agencies report them, we also needed to develop an alternative mapping
strategy.
The most attractive alternative is based on Federal Register citations.
Part of the information reported in the Unified Agenda is a citation to the
Federal Register entry for each reported action, though many Unified
Agenda entries were missing these citations. When available, we use the
Federal Register citation listed for the NPRM in the Unified Agenda to
match the Unified Agenda to the population of NPRMs. The combination
of RIN-based matching and this approach produce a match for
approximately 20,000 UA entries in our population of roughly 27,000
Unified Agenda entries that list a NPRM. As a result, after this first
approach to matching, we have some 7000 “orphan” Unified Agenda
entries, which the Unified Agenda lists a NPRM as an action for the rule,
but for which we have no corresponding match in the Federal Register
dataset. Generally, this lack of a match seems to result from incomplete
data: not infrequently, as mentioned, the Unified Agenda does not list a
Federal Register cite at all. Other times, the Federal Register cite is
erroneous (e.g., it lists a “7” instead of a “1” for a page number). Still other
times, the entry may be more phantom than orphan: for example, the
agency may not end up in fact issuing a NPRM.
We have examined a number of approaches to dealing with these
orphan entries, but they all involve considerable error. As such, the main
209. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, How to Use the Unified Agenda, REGINFO,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/UA_HowTo.jsp (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
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results we report in the main body exclude the orphan entries. That said, the
most promising approach we did find involves relying on the descriptions
of the rules contained in the Unified Agenda and Federal Register. First, we
extract the “abstract” (Unified Agenda) or “summary” (Federal Register)
information from the two datasets. These short descriptions generally
consist of roughly 100–300 words that state the essence of what the agency
is accomplishing in the rule. We also considered using the rule titles, but in
practice found them often not sufficiently informative.
Second, we tokenize, stem, and vectorize the text in these fields in the
standard fashion. Tokenization involves taking a string of text and
separating it into a set of words. Stemming involves taking the words, or
tokens, and grouping them into lexemes, or more basic lexical units. For
example, the words “sit,” “sits,” and “sitting” all belong to the same basic
lexical unit. Finally, vectorization involves representing the stemmed
tokens for a given string as a numeric vector, where each position in the
vector encodes a specific stemmed token, and all stemmed tokens in the
more general body of the text (here, rule abstracts and summaries) have a
designated position in the vector. For example, if the string in question
contained the word “sit,” the vector would take “1” in the position for that
word; if the string in question did not have the word “sit,” the vector for
that string would take a “0” in the same position.210
Third, we calculate the cosine similarity, a standard metric of the
distance between two vectors, between each orphaned Unified Agenda
entry and every entry in the Federal Register dataset that (1) was issued in
the same month as the Unified Agenda action report indicates the NPRM
was issued and (2) does not already have a Unified Agenda match based on
citations. We then retain the top 10 matches for further investigation. The
cosine similarity between two vectors is given by (A∙B)/(||A||||B||), and
ranges in this context between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating more
similarity between the two vectors. We then match each orphaned Unified
Agenda entry to the to the Federal Register entry for which it has the
highest similarity; if two Unified Agenda entries both match to the same
Federal Register entry, the winner is the Unified Agenda entry with the
higher similarity score, and we then rely on the second highest score for the
loser, and so on. We discard any match with a similarity score of less than
some threshold. If the threshold is set at 0.1, for example, this approach
produces roughly another 5000 matches, so that after including these
210. For more on the statistical processing of text, see generally CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING &
HINRICH SCHUTZE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICAL NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING (1999).
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additional matches, we find a pairing for roughly 25,000 of the 27,000
entries in the Unified Agenda that list a NPRM as a relevant action.
While this approach was better than other alternatives, we ultimately
did not feel confident in the matches generated. Thus, our main results
exclude matches generated through this procedure, though we offer it here
mainly as a possible step towards a future refinement of the dataset.
Regardless, we will make the results that incorporate these matches
available upon request. Qualitatively, they resemble the results reported
above.
Finally, after creating a mapping between the two datasets, we must
then determine whether the Unified Agenda entry precedes the appearance
of the proposed rule in the Federal Register. We do so by comparing the
date of the Unified Agenda in which the rule made its first appearance, to
the date the agency published the proposed rule in the Federal Register.
More specifically, we identify the first time that the rule appeared in the
Agenda using the RIN to trace the rule, and then associate that Agenda
publication with the date it appeared in the Federal Register.
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APPENDIX C: AGENCY CODES
TABLE A1. Key for Agency Codes
Abbreviation

Full Name

Agriculture

Department of Agriculture

BOP

Bureau of Prisons

CFTC*

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Commerce

Department of Commerce

CPSC*

Consumer Product Safety Commission

Defense

Department of Defense

DHS

Department of Homeland Security

Education

Department of Education

Energy

Department of Energy

EPA

Environmental Protection Agency

FCA

Farm Credit Administration

FCC*

Federal Communications Commission

FDIC*

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

FED*

Federal Reserve

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FERC*

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

FHLBB

Federal Home Loan Bank Board

FMC*

Federal Maritime Commission

FTC*

Federal Trade Commission

GAO

Government Accountability Office

GSA

General Services Administration

HHS

Department of Health and Human Services

HUD

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Int'l Trade Commission

International Trade Commission

Interior

Department of Interior

Justice

Department of Justice
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Labor

Department of Labor

NOAA

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NRC*

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NUCA

National Credit Union Administration

OPM

Office of Personnel Management

Other

Residual category

PBGC

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation

RRB

Railroad Retirement Board

SBA

Small Business Administration

SEC*

Securities and Exchange Commission

SSA

Social Security Administration

State

Department of State

Transportation

Department of Transportation

Treasury

Department of Treasury

USPS

United States Postal Service

VA

Veterans Administration

Note: An asterisk (*) denotes an “independent” agency, as classified in the Paperwork Reduction
Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012). “Other” agencies include those agencies with names reported in a
non-standard fashion. These agencies often engaged in little rulemaking. See supra note 113 for
further explanation.

* Denotes an “independent” agency, as classified in the Paperwork
Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012).

